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The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), the court created to adjudicate
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo at the turn of
the century, is the world’s newest hybrid tribunal. The KSC is classified as
a hybrid tribunal because it ostensibly blends aspects of international and
domestic law and resources. Upon examination, however, the KSC departs
in critical ways from the traditional concept of a hybrid tribunal,
representing an internationally dominated court with minimal local
involvement. By detailing the history of judicial mechanisms employed to
prosecute crimes committed during and in the aftermath of the Kosovo War
from 1998-1999, this Article examines how the international community has
commandeered Kosovo’s justice system, often at the expense of the Kosovar
people’s wants and needs. This Article argues that the KSC, the international
community’s latest attempt to prosecute these crimes, represents a new breed
of overtly internationalized hybrid tribunal that subverts the goals inherent
in the hybrid model of prosecution, namely the ability to provide local
ownership over proceedings, facilitate legitimacy and capacity building of
judicial personnel and infrastructure, and provide transitional justice
measures to post-conflict communities.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 240
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HYBRID TRIBUNALS ............................................... 246
III. TIMELINE OF JUSTICE IN KOSOVO ....................................................... 249
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ........ 250
1. The ICTY’s Mandate, Jurisdiction and Proceedings ................. 250
2. The ICTY’s Transition and Legacy ........................................... 252
B. The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Regulation 64 Panels ........................................................................ 253
1. UNMIK’s Mandate, Jurisdiction and Proceedings .................... 254
2. UNMIK’s Transition and Legacy .............................................. 255
Copyright © 2022 Sara L. Ochs & Kirbi Walters
*Sara L. Ochs is an Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Louisville, Louis D. Brandeis School
of Law and a visiting researcher and U.S. Fulbright Scholar at the University of Gothenburg School of
Global Studies (2022-23).
**Kirbi Walters earned her J.D. from Elon University School of Law.

239

OCHS READY FOR ADOBE (DO NOT DELETE)

240

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/19/2022 10:08 PM

[Vol 32:239

C. The European Union Rule of Law in Kosovo (EULEX) Courts ......... 256
1. EULEX’s Mandate and Jurisdiction .......................................... 256
2. EULEX’s Legacy and Transition............................................... 258
3. Collective Criticisms .................................................................. 259
IV. THE KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS ................................................ 263
A. Creation ............................................................................................... 264
B. Mandate, Jurisdiction, and Organizational Structure........................... 265
V. A NEW BREED OF HYBRID TRIBUNAL .................................................. 268
A. Flawed Circumstances for a Hybrid Court .......................................... 268
1. Lack of Local & Political Support ............................................. 269
2. Multiple Attempts at Justice ...................................................... 273
B. Undermining Hybrid Objectives ......................................................... 275
1. Reconciliation ............................................................................ 277
2. Peace & Stability ....................................................................... 279
3. Capacity Building ...................................................................... 281
C. Dangerous Precedent for Hybrid Tribunals ......................................... 282
VI. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 284

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Kosovo War at the turn of the century, Kosovo has been
molded by Western powers. In the last two decades, as it has struggled to
prove itself as a globally recognized independent nation, powerful countries
such as the United States and organizations like the United Nations (UN) and
the European Union (EU) have pressured the fledgling state into operating
in ways that promote their own interests. One area in which this external
pressure is most evident is achieving justice for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed during and immediately after the 1998–1999
Kosovo War. To date, four different internationally operated judicial
mechanisms have worked to investigate and prosecute crimes committed
during this period of violence.1 The most recent, the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers (KSC), evidences the extent to which international organizations
are driving justice at the expense of the wants and needs of the Kosovar
people.
Kosovo, previously an autonomous province within Serbia, has long
shared a tenuous relationship with its former sovereign.2 Throughout the
1. See GËZIM VISOKA, ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE KOSOVO SPECIALIST COURT
13–16 (2017) (discussing the evolution of criminal justice mechanisms dedicated to the prosecution of
crimes committed in the Kosovo War, from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia; two sets of hybrid courts operated by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) and the subsequent EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX); to, most recently, the KSC).
2. See Todd Carney, Deal or No Deal? International Influence and the Serbia-Kosovo Conflict,
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1980s, Kosovo sought greater self-governance measures and recognition as
an independent republic, and in the 1990s, with the rise of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), it began resorting to armed violence to achieve
independence.3 In March 1999, the Serbian police and military, under the
command of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, launched a military
offensive and campaign of ethnic cleansing against Kosovo’s ethnic
Albanian population.4 The conflict ultimately culminated in a NATO air
campaign conducted between March 24 and June 10, 1999, which eventually
prompted the conflict’s resolution.5 By its conclusion, more than 13,535
people were dead, the vast majority of whom were Kosovar Albanians;6
more than 1.5 million ethnic Albanians—amounting to 90 percent of the
Kosovar Albanian population—had been displaced.7
Following the conflict, the UN and EU led the charge to prosecute
crimes committed during the Kosovo War by establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a UN-funded and
sourced ad hoc international criminal tribunal, and two subsequent mixed
judicial mechanisms that blended Kosovar resources with those provided by
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and later the EU Rule of Law Mission
in Kosovo (EULEX).8 Each of these courts encountered similar problems,
LAWFARE (Apr. 8, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deal-or-no-deal-internationalinfluence-and-serbia-kosovo-conflict (detailing the history behind Serbia and Kosovo’s long-running
conflict); Stefan Lehne, Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship 4 (2012) (explaining that
today Serbia does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state and that it has actively sought to bar
Kosovo from membership in “most international organizations and even from international sporting
events”).
3. OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK FOR DESIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY
MECHANISMS FOR GRAVE CRIMES, OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE 533 (2018) [hereinafter OPTIONS
FOR JUSTICE].
4. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 533–34.
5. Id. at 534; Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ¶ 1 (June 13, 2000), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf.
6. VISOKA, supra note 1, at 13 (finding that of this figure, 10,812 casualties, or 80 percent of the
total casualty count, were ethnic Albanians). Included within this figure are approximately 500 civilians
killed by NATO bombings. 754 Victims of NATO Bombing, HUMANITARIAN L. CTR. (Mar. 23, 2018),
http://www.hlc-rdc.org/?p=34890&lang=de (calculating the death toll of the NATO bombing at 754
victims, including 454 civilians); HUM. RTS. WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR CAMPAIGN 5
(2000), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/natbm002.pdf (concluding that in 90 incidents of
NATO bombing, “as few as 488 and as many as 527 Yugoslav civilians were killed”).
7. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ETHNIC CLEANSING IN KOSOVO: AN ACCOUNTING, REPORT 3 (1999).
The precise figures pertaining to displacement differ depending on the source; other sources have
calculated that the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign “expelled nearly 80 percent of the entire population
of Kosovo from their homes, including more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo.” OPTIONS FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 534.
8. See OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 533–65 (extensively explaining the post-war justice
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including witness tampering, political interference from the Kosovo
Government, and a general lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Kosovar
people, causing the courts to achieve fewer tangible results than anticipated.9
In 2015, under significant pressure from the EU and other Western
powers, including the United States, the Assembly of Kosovo amended the
Kosovo Constitution to create the KSC and its prosecutorial unit, the
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.10 The Court’s creators intended the KSC, like
the courts that came before it, to prosecute and adjudicate “international
crimes committed during and in the aftermath of the conflict in Kosovo.”11
Unlike the predecessor courts, however, the crimes within the KSC’s
jurisdiction pertain primarily to post-war crimes committed by the KLA as
part of an alleged “campaign of persecution” against Serbs, Serb
sympathizers, and others deemed political opponents.12 In creating the KSC,
both the EU and the United States intended for the Court to achieve justice
for the KLA’s unpunished crimes, as well as to strengthen the rule of law
and promote reconciliation within Kosovo.13 Yet the Court’s structure and
composition present significant concerns as to the possibility of achieving
these goals.
The KSC is regularly represented as a hybrid tribunal,14 meaning that it

mechanisms established to prosecute crimes committed in Kosovo).
9. The respective and collective challenges faced by these three courts will be discussed at length
later in this article. See infra Section III.
10. Aidan Hehir, The Assumptions Underlying the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Their
Implications, 20 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 17, 27 (2020) [hereinafter Hehir, The Assumptions].
11. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 1(2) (Kos.).
12. Id.; Special Investigative Task Force, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor of the Special
Investigative
Task
Force,
at
1–2
(July
29,
2014),
https://www.recom.link/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Download-full-statement-here.pdf [hereinafter SITF Statement].
13. U.S. Embassy Pristina, Statement of EU Embassies/Offices, EUSR/EU Office and US Embassy
in Kosovo on the Adoption of Constitutional Amendment and Law on the Establishment of the Specialist
Chambers, U.S. EMBASSY IN KOS. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://xk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement/.
14. See, e.g., Andrea Trigoso, The Kosovo Specialist Chambers: In Need of Local Legitimacy,
OPINIO JURIS (June 6, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/06/08/the-kosovo-specialist-chambers-in-needof-local-legitimacy/ (labeling the KSC a “hybrid [c]ourt”); Ruth Green, International Justice: Kosovo
Specialist Chambers on Cusp of Indicting War Criminals, INT’L BAR ASSOC. (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=588337F8-1BE6-4988-B49C3143EC2D5DB3 (referring to the KSC as a “hybrid court approach”); Aidan Hehir, Lessons Learned?
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ Lack of Local Legitimacy and its Implications, 20 HUM. RTS. REV.
267, 268 (2019) [hereinafter Hehir, Lessons Learned?] (recognizing the KSC as “part of a renewed global
trend in favour of ‘hybrid’ tribunals”); Silvia Steninger, The Kosovo Specialist Chambers: A New Chapter
for International Criminal Justice in the Balkans, VOLKERRECHTSBLOG (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/the-kosovo-specialist-chambers/ (noting that “[t]he KSC follows a hybrid
model”).
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combines aspects of international and domestic justice.15 Despite the
amorphous definition of the term “hybrid tribunal,”16 this judicial model
generally aims to incorporate involvement of state actors and victims with
international oversight to achieve justice for grave crimes and periods of
mass violence. To do so, hybrid tribunals typically employ local judges,
lawyers, and staff and sit within the state that they are designed to serve.17
The KSC lacks many of the typical characteristics that render a court a hybrid
tribunal.18 While it is a product of and applies—in part—Kosovo law,19 it is
dominated by international features, with marginal local involvement.
Despite its title, the KSC is seated in The Hague, thousands of miles from
Kosovo and neighboring Albania, where the crimes within its mandate were
committed.20 Both the KSC and its prosecutorial unit, the Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office, are staffed exclusively with international judges,
counsel, and staff,21 and the Court is funded primarily by the EU, “with no
financial implications for Kosovo.”22
Complementing the excessively internationalized nature of the KSC,
the creation of the Court was driven nearly exclusively by international
15. See Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National
Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347, 356 (2006) (noting that “hybrids blend the
international and the domestic … [and] in all cases their nature is mixed”); KIRSTEN AINLEY & MARK
KERSTEN, DAKAR GUIDELINES ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HYBRID COURTS 6 (2019) [hereinafter
DAKAR GUIDELINES] (“There is no consensus on what makes a hybrid tribunal ‘hybrid.’”).
16. Higonnet, supra note 15, at 356 (recognizing that the “precise definition” of hybrid tribunals is
still evolving); Harry Hobbs, Hybrid Tribunals and the Composition of the Court: In Search of
Sociological Legitimacy, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 482, 491 (2016) (acknowledging that hybrid courts “defy
simple definition”).
17. Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 169,
172 (2016) (recognizing that traditional characteristics of hybrid tribunals include location within the
“target state” and a mixed composition of international and domestic personnel).
18. Carsten Stahn, Tribunals are Dead, Long Live Tribunals: MICT, the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers
and
the
Turn
to
New
Hybridity, EJIL:TALK!
(Sept.
23,
2016),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/tribunals-are-dead-long-live-tribunals-mict-the-kosovo-specialist-chambersand-the-turn-to-new-hybridity/ (recognizing the KSC as a “variation[] on the theme” of hybrid tribunals).
19. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 3(1) (Kos.).
20. See generally Agreement Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Kosovo
Concerning the Hosting of the Kosovo Relocated Specialist Judicial Institution in the Netherlands, Neth.Kos., Feb. 15, 2016, Trb. 2016, 27 [hereinafter Host Agreement] (agreeing that the Kosovo Specialist
Chambers will be hosted in the Netherlands).
21. See Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 28
(Kos.); Sarah Williams, The Specialist Chambers of Kosovo: The Limits of Internationalization?, 14 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 25, 35 (2016) (noting that the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office
will be “staffed entirely by international personnel, from judges to investigators and interpreters”).
22. Robert Muharremi, The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, 76
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [J. FOREIGN PUB. L. &
INT’L L.] 967, 987 (2016) (Ger.).
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powers.23 International actors have long taken a significant interest in
Kosovo’s affairs and—having dedicated substantial time, resources, and
hundreds of millions of dollars in funds to the country—would now view a
failure to achieve comprehensive justice in Kosovo as a political
disappointment and a publicity nightmare.24 Moreover, as scholar Robert
Muharremi has recognized, establishing the KSC as an “internationally
controlled ‘national’ court” allows NATO member states like the United
States and EU states to dictate the Court’s jurisdictional reach to avoid
potential prosecution of NATO crimes committed during the Kosovo War.25
However, the goals of these international powers conflict with those
held by the Kosovo Government and the Kosovar people. At the time of the
KSC’s creation, the idea for an internationalized court that would primarily
prosecute KLA members failed to garner support within Kosovo,26 and
instead sparked protests.27 Many Kosovo Assembly members and other state
leaders—some of whom are former KLA members themselves—advocated
openly against the creation of the Court and ultimately only consented to the
KLA’s creation as a result of “great pressure from the international
community.”28
By structuring the KSC to minimize local Kosovar involvement, the
KSC’s creators aimed, in part, to minimize the very real threat of political
interference and witness tampering—critical issues that have plagued prior
courts devoted to prosecuting crimes committed in Kosovo.29 Yet, at the
same time, the internationalization of the Court cuts the Kosovar people out
of the justice process and undermines many of the essential goals of hybrid
23. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 26.
24. Id. at 23 (explaining that because “the West has invested significant political capital in Kosovo,”
“[s]ince 1999 . . . Kosovo’s fate has been linked to Western prestige,” and that “a return to ethnic violence
in Kosovo would naturally be widely seen as evidence that the West’s state building efforts ‘failed’”);
see also MARTIN RUSSELL, SERBIA-KOSOVO RELATIONS: CONFRONTATION OR NORMALISATION? 2–3
(2019) (detailing the EU’s role in normalizing Serbia-Kosovo relations, and noting that the EU has served
as Kosovo’s largest aid donor); European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUR.
COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/funding-by-country/kosovo_en
(last visited Jan. 9, 2020) (representing the EU’s allocation of 602.1 million in funds for financial
assistance to Kosovo, intended to support a number of “priority sectors” in the nation, including
“democracy and governance” and “rule of law and fundamental rights”).
25. Robert Muharremi, The Kosovo Specialist Chambers from a Political Realism Perspective, 13
INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 290, 303 (2019).
26. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 26–27.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 27 (quoting Special Court for KLA crimes ‘Cannot be Abolished’ – Thaci, B92 (Feb. 1,
2018,
5:03
PM),
https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2018&mm=02&dd=01&nav_id=103403).
29. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 25.
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tribunals. The Court has effectively replaced the Kosovar people’s calls for
justice with the objectives of the international community. Moreover, the
KSC presents a risk of future unfettered internationalization of hybrid
tribunals that could undermine state objectives as well as the many goals of
hybrid prosecution.
The stakes for the KSC are high, both with regard to the future of
Kosovo—a somewhat volatile nation-state—and for the future of
international criminal justice. The KSC begins its operations when Kosovo
is in the midst of a concerted effort to normalize its relations with its neighbor
and previous sovereign, Serbia, in attempts to obtain EU membership.30 At
the same time, the field of international criminal law is only just hesitantly
returning to the use of hybrid tribunals to prosecute mass atrocities.31 This
Article argues that permitting powerful states and international organizations
to monopolize hybrid tribunals sets a dangerous precedent that threatens the
objectives and legitimacy of hybrid courts and jeopardizes the future of the
hybrid model of international prosecution.
Part II explains the typical structure and goals of hybrid tribunals and
situates them in the landscape of international criminal justice. Part III
provides a comprehensive overview of the origins of the KSC while tracing
the multiple efforts by the EU, the UN, and the international community at
large to investigate and prosecute internationally recognized crimes
committed during the Kosovo War. In doing so, it shines particular light on
challenges faced by the ad hoc ICTY, as well as the subsequent two
internationally-sponsored hybrid courts dedicated exclusively to prosecuting
crimes committed in Kosovo: the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) Regulation 64 Panels and the courts established by the European
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).
Part IV then explains the circumstances that led to the creation of the
KSC and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, as well as the KSC’s
organization and the characteristics that render it an international court, and
decidedly less so a hybrid tribunal. Part V concludes by arguing that creating
the KSC as an internationalized hybrid tribunal with minimal local input was
improper. The circumstances in Kosovo, a nascent nation approximately
30. Fatos Bytyci, West Tells Kosovo and Serbia to Return to Negotiating Table, REUTERS (Aug. 13,
2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-serbia-dialog/west-tells-kosovo-andserbia-to-return-to-negotiating-table-idUSKCN1V31E4; Andrew Rettman & Ekrem Krasniqi, Kosovo to
Restart EU/US-led Serbia Talks, EU OBSERVER (June 4, 2020, 7:09 AM),
https://euobserver.com/enlargement/148553.
31. See Dakar Guidelines, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that since 2014, the hybrid model has “once
again emerged as a popular response to mass atrocities”); Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 17–
18 (noting that the KSC represented to some a “new appetite” for hybrid tribunals).
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twenty years removed from the crimes subject to prosecution, rendered a
hybrid tribunal inefficient from the start. Structuring the KSC to preclude
local involvement also undermines the widely recognized goals of hybrid
tribunals, such as the ability to provide local ownership, capacity building
and transitional justice initiatives, and stability within Kosovo and the
greater region. Finally, the Article considers the potential consequences the
internationalization of the KSC may have on the future of hybrid tribunals
and the threat this may pose to the hybrid model moving forward.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HYBRID TRIBUNALS
While a general preference exists for domestic courts to prosecute
crimes committed within their territory or by their nationals, following
periods of prolonged violence or human rights abuses, domestic prosecution
is often impossible.32 For one, domestic courts in post-conflict states often
lack sufficient capacity—in terms of personnel and infrastructure—to
conduct fair or effective trials.33 Likewise, domestic court judges and
personnel may themselves have ties to, or be under the influence of, the
regime responsible for some or all of the atrocities committed during the
violent period.34 Accordingly, in post-conflict states, domestic prosecution
is oftentimes highly unlikely or altogether impossible.35 While international
courts—such as the ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court
(ICC)—were created in part to limit impunity for atrocity crimes that went
unpunished by domestic courts, these international courts have often
presented their own concerns, including a lack of local involvement,
prolonged and lengthy proceedings, and significant budgets.36 The concept
of hybrid courts thus emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s to address
the concerns of the purely international courts, and to offer yet another means
for prosecuting crimes that fall outside the jurisdiction or prosecutorial
selection of the ICC, as well as those that would otherwise meet impunity as
a result of a domestic failure to prosecute.37
The hybrid model of prosecution is often referred to as the “third
generation” of international criminal courts, following the initial
32. Sara L. Ochs, A Renewed Call for Hybrid Tribunals, 52 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 351, 392–93
(2020); Padraig McAuliffe, Hybrid Tribunals at Ten: How International Criminal Justice’s Golden Child
Became an Orphan, 7 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 1, 2–3 (2011).
33. Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 252 (2007).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. McAuliffe, supra note 3215, at 11; Higonnet, supra note 15, at 347.
37. Higonnet, supra note 15, at 349; Ochs, supra note 32, at 393.
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international tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the subsequent ad hoc
criminal tribunals created to prosecute the atrocities in Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia.38 Through hybrid courts, the international community
intended to create a new form of adjudication that would blend elements of
local and international legality, so as to foster local ownership and legitimacy
and to return proceedings—at least in part—to the affected states.39
Hybrid courts were initially intended to: be located in the state in which
the crimes within their mandate had occurred; employ state judges, lawyers,
and personnel in addition to their international counterparts; and engage in
more effective on-the-ground outreach that could easily be adapted to the
circumstances of the affected state.40 These features would theoretically
provide the affected state with a new level of ownership over the justice
process that was lacking in the previous international courts, and would
correspondingly carry greater opportunities for establishing legitimacy
among local communities.41 International actors predicted that this
legitimacy would fuel additional successes for hybrid courts in post-conflict
states insofar as cultivating an appreciation for the rule of law, contributing
to capacity building for local legal communities, and fostering reconciliation
and stability.42 Essentially, the hybrid model sought to combine the best of
both worlds: local ownership and legitimacy with international expertise and
oversight.43
38. Higonnet, supra note 15, at 352–53.
39. See Higonnet, supra note 15, at 352–54; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Making the State Do Justice:
Transnational Prosecutions and International Support for Criminal Investigations in Post-Armed
Conflict Guatemala, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 79, 81 (2008); see also David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East
Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 1, 5–6 (2007) (defining local ownership).
40. Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 295 (2003); see
also Lindsey Raub, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Justice, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 1013, 1043 (2009) (identifying hybrid tribunals’ ability to be flexible and to tailor “to the
specific needs of the affected community” as their “primary benefit”).
41. See Hobbs, supra note 16, at 492; see also Raub, supra note 40, at 1044 (“Involvement by the
national judiciary and domestic personnel imparts a sense of local ownership to the tribunal’s work, which
usually increases accessibility, accountability, and perceived legitimacy for the local, affected
community.”).
42. See Padraig McAuliffe, supra note 32, at 7–8 (explaining that the “mixed nature of hybrid courts
offered possibilities which hitherto had not existed,” such as capacity-building and norm penetration);
Jennifer Trahan, Views of the Future of the Field of International Justice: A Scenarios Project Based on
Expert Consultations, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 837, 883 (2018) (listing the “factors cited for supporting
the creation of added hybrid tribunals,” many of which are tied to legitimacy).
43. James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals, 28
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616, 619 (2004) (explaining that the aim of the hybrid model is “to marry the best
of two worlds—the expertise of the international community with the legitimacy of local actors”);
Higonnet, supra note 15, at 349.
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With these goals in mind, between 2000 and 2007, the international
community created a number of hybrid tribunals, including the UNMIK
Regulation 64 Panels and EULEX Courts in Kosovo, as well as courts in
East Timor, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Lebanon.44 Each of these
courts varied significantly in their design and means of establishment and
represented a varying balance of national and international interests.45
Among these initial hybrid tribunals, scholars acknowledge two general
categories: the “internationalized domestic courts” and the “international
tribunal[s] with domestic elements.”46 The former category includes courts
placed within the domestic judicial system of the target state, such as the
Regulation 64 Panels and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, which tend to lean towards the domestic end of the hybrid
spectrum, while the latter category refers to highly internationalized courts
with minimal domestic connections, such as the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon.47
Neither category of hybrid court has found itself immune from
difficulties. The courts on the domestic end of the hybrid spectrum have
encountered common challenges such as political interference in judicial
proceedings.48 Those courts on the internationalized end of the spectrum,
however, have lacked a connection to the local population and have been
locally perceived as imposing unwanted international objectives on domestic
justice.49 For instance, Lebanese critics of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon—arguably the most internationalized hybrid court prior to the
KSC—described the Tribunal as a means for “world powers to play out their
44. Hobbs, supra note 16, at 488; Higonnet, supra note 15, at 353–54.
45. See Elizabeth Nielsen, Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals: Political Interference and
Judicial Independence, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 289, 292 (2010) (noting that the
“institutional apparatuses and the applicable laws” vary among hybrid courts).
46. Muharremi, supra note 22, at 989; see also Nielsen, supra note 45, at 325 (recognizing the two
ends of the hybrid spectrum as a “domestic system with limited international features” and “a mainly
international tribunal with a few national elements”).
47. STEVEN R. RATNER ET AL., ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 247 (3d ed. 2009) (noting that the Special
Court for Sierra Leone views itself as an “international institution” independent of the Sierra Leonean
judicial system).
48. See id. at 253 (explaining that the Cambodian hybrid tribunal suffered from political pressures
exerted by the Cambodian government, but that the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which remained
removed from the Sierra Leonean legal system “maintained near complete freedom of action”).
49. See Reem Salahi & Bachar El-Halabi, The Limits of The Special Tribunal for Lebanon and What
Syrians Can Learn, ATL. COUNCIL (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/menasource/the-limits-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon-and-what-syrians-can-learn/ (arguing
that the Special Tribunal has failed to make notable change within Lebanon by failing to incorporate local
involvement or transitional justice into their judicial process).
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strategies.”50
The challenges faced by both the domesticated and internationalized
hybrid courts have produced “decidedly mixed” results for the hybrid
model.51 The relatively large number of hybrid tribunals created over a short
period and their failure to achieve the idealistic goals set led many in the
international community to experience a feeling of “tribunal fatigue.”52 As a
result, for seven years, between 2007 and 2014, the international community
did not establish any new hybrid courts.53 However, the international
community has recently become reenergized about hybrid tribunals, and the
creation of the KSC, along with proposals for hybrid courts to prosecute
mass atrocities in Syria, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia, demonstrate a cautious
return to the hybrid model.54
At a time when a number of high-profile state-sponsored mass
atrocities, such as those committed in China and Syria, are falling outside of
the jurisdiction of the ICC,55 the hybrid model represents a great opportunity
to address impunity for these crimes. However, given the past challenges and
failings encountered by the hybrid model of prosecution, much hinges on the
success of the newly created hybrid courts, including the KSC, to validate
the hybrid model as a successful method of prosecuting atrocity crimes.
III. TIMELINE OF JUSTICE IN KOSOVO
This section explores the evolution of justice in Kosovo for crimes
committed in the context of the Kosovo War. Specifically, it will trace the
background, operations, and legacy of three internationally-created judicial
mechanisms designed to investigate and prosecute these crimes: the ICTY,
the UNMIK Regulation 64 Panels, and the EULEX Courts.

50. Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 3 BERKELEY
J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 173, 201 (2010).
51. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 17–18.
52. Id. at 18.
53. Hobbs, supra note 16, at 485 & n.8 (recognizing this time as a “period of dormancy” for hybrid
courts).
54. DAKAR GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 1.
55. See OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION
ACTIVITIES ¶¶ 70–76 (2020) (setting forth the International Criminal Court Prosecutor’s decision not to
proceed with an investigation into allegations that Chinese officials have committed genocide and crimes
against humanity against Uyghur Muslims due to a lack of jurisdiction over these alleged crimes); Milena
Sterio, Sequencing Peace and Justice in Syria, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 345, 355–56 (2018) (noting
that the ICC would be of “limited utility” in prosecuting atrocities committed in Syria due to jurisdictional
complications stemming from Syria’s lack of membership to the Rome Statute).
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A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The United Nations Security Council established the ICTY under its
Article VII powers in 1993 to prosecute egregious crimes committed during
the multiple conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s.56 The ICTY’s
establishment marked the first war crimes tribunal created since the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, which were established nearly fifty years
prior.57 The Security Council’s goal in creating the ICTY was to put an end
to the ongoing crimes in the Balkans and “to contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace.”58
1. The ICTY’s Mandate, Jurisdiction and Proceedings
The ICTY Statute served as the Court’s originating document and
granted it jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide committed in the Former Yugoslavia.59 The Statute specifically
bestowed the ICTY with jurisdiction over these crimes committed during
and following January 1991, and left its temporal jurisdiction open-ended.60
While the Statute granted the ICTY and domestic courts concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute crimes within the ICTY’s Mandate, it determined
that the ICTY would have primacy over domestic courts, including the power
to request that domestic courts transfer a case to the ICTY at any stage of
proceedings.61
On paper, the ICTY Mandate allowed for the investigation and
prosecution of crimes committed during the Kosovo War, and the ICTY
Prosecutor issued several press releases as early as March 1998 affirming the
Tribunal’s ability to hear these cases.62 However, Serbian President
56. About the ICTY, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
https://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Jan. 8, 2021).
57. Id.
58. Marie-Claude Roberge, Jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda Over Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide, 321 INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS 651, 651
(1997).
59. Int’l Trib. for the Prosecution of Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian
L. Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute of the International
Criminal
Tribunal
for
the
Former
Yugoslavia,
arts.
2–6,
8
(2009),
https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf.
60. Id. art. 8.
61. Id. art. 9.
62. Press Release, U.N. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor’s Statement
Regarding the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over Kosovo, U.N. Press Release CC/PIO/302-E (Mar. 10, 1998);
Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Kosovo: Statement by Justice Louise Arbour,
Prosecutor of the ICTY, U.N. Press Release CC/PIU/378-E (Jan. 16, 1999) [hereinafter Kosovo:
Statement by Justice Louise Arbour]; see also Kerry R. Wortzel, The Jurisdiction of an International
Criminal Tribunal in Kosovo, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 379, 389 (1999) (finding that Kosovo clearly falls
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Slobodan Milošević stridently refused to accept the ICTY’s claim of
jurisdiction over events that were taking place in Kosovo in 1998 and early
1999.63 At his behest, Serbian authorities made the ICTY’s investigations
into crimes committed in Kosovo nearly impossible by revoking visas of
ICTY members and refusing to allow the ICTY Prosecutor to enter
Kosovo.64 Largely in light of these challenges, in 1999, the ICTY Prosecutor
made clear that the ICTY would not serve as “the primary investigative and
prosecutorial agency for all criminal acts committed on the territory of
Kosovo.”65 Instead, the Prosecutor declared that the ICTY would only
prosecute individuals who held leadership positions during and alleged
perpetrators of particularly serious crimes related to the Kosovo War.66 She
further directed that all other crimes related to the Kosovo War should be
investigated and prosecuted by UNMIK,67 the UN’s transitional government
in Kosovo.68
Despite the Prosecutor’s 1999 statement, the Office of the Prosecutor
did pursue two cases involving atrocities committed during the Kosovo War
by Kosovar nationals.69 First, in the Limaj Case, the ICTY Prosecutor filed
indictments against three alleged former KLA members: Fatmir Limaj,
Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu.70 The Prosecutor charged the three men with
various war crimes and crimes against humanity, including imprisonment,
torture, and murder. These charges stemmed from allegations that they
detained, tortured, and killed Kosovar civilians—including both ethnic
Serbians and Albanians—who they deemed to be Serbian collaborators at a

within the ICTY’s geographic jurisdiction).
63. See Press Release, U.N. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Press Statement from the
Prosecutor Regarding Kosovo Investigation, U.N. Press Release CC/PIU/379-E (Jan. 20, 1999) (noting
that President Milosevic denied the ICTY access to Kosovo to conduct investigations into alleged war
crimes and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia denied the jurisdiction of the ICTY).
64. Id.; HUMAN RTS. WATCH, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA: A WEEK OF TERROR IN
DRENICA 84–85 (1999).
65. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia, Statement by Carla Del Ponte,
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the Investigation and
Prosecution of Crimes Committed in Kosovo, U.N. Press Release PR/P.I.S./437-E (Sept. 29, 1999).
66. Id.
67. Id65.
68. TOM PERRIELLO & MARIEKE WIERDA, INT’L CTR. TRANSITIONAL JUST., LESSONS FROM THE
DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN KOSOVO 6 (2006),
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-FormerYugoslavia-Courts-Study-2006-English_0.pdf.
69. ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR., MISSION IN KOSOVO, KOSOVO’S WAR CRIMES TRIALS: AN
ASSESSMENT TEN YEARS ON 1999–2009, at 13 (2010).
70. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-I, Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Jan. 24, 2003).
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prison camp in Kosovo during the Kosovo War.71 In 2005, the Trial Chamber
found Limaj and Musliu not guilty of all charges.72 It convicted the
remaining accused, Bala, of the war crimes of torture, cruel treatment, and
murder and sentenced him to thirteen years in prison.73
Then, in the Haradinaj Case, the ICTY Prosecutor indicted three
additional former KLA members for war crimes and crimes against
humanity stemming from allegations that the men raped, murdered, and
tortured civilians, primarily ethnic Serbs and those deemed Serb
sympathizers, while conducting a military operation to drive ethnic Serbs out
of villages in the Dukagjin Zone of Kosovo.74 Following an initial trial and
a re-trial, the Trial Chamber found all three men—Ramush Haradinaj, Idris
Balaj, and Lahi Brahimaj—not guilty on all counts in the indictment.75
2. The ICTY’s Transition and Legacy
At the conclusion of its mandate, the ICTY had indicted 161
individuals for crimes committed during the Balkan Wars and convicted and
sentenced 91.76 By the time it closed its doors in 2017, in addition to
delivering justice for victims, the ICTY had also made significant
contributions to the development of international criminal law.77 However,
its legacy was blemished by unnecessarily long trials and proceedings, the
incurrence of significant expenses that far exceeded the Court’s budget,
limited cooperation from state authorities, a failure to involve victims in the
justice process, and problems with witness protection, among other

71. Id.; see also Bruce Zagaris, ICTY Indicts KLA Members, Serb, Leader, and Continue to Prepare
for Closing, 19 INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 158 (2003); Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Limaj Judgement Summary, at 1 (Nov. 30, 2005) (summarizing the charges against the
defendants).
72. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 740–43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005).
73. Id. ¶¶ 741–42. The Appeals Chamber affirmed Bala’s conviction on appeal. Press Release, Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Summary of the Appeal: Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin,
Bala, and Isak Musliu, at 9, U.N. Press Release CVO/MOW/1184a (Sept. 27, 2007).
74. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgement Summary for the Case
of
Haradinaj
et.
al.,
at
1
(Apr.
3,
2008),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403_Haradinajetal._summary_en.pdf.
75. Press Release, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgment Summary for Haradinaj,
et al, at 3–4 (July 21, 2010), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/acjug/en/100721_summary.pdf.
76. Key Figures of the Cases, U.N. INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (May.
2021), https://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases.
77. Frédéric Mégret, The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen Through Some of its Actors and Observers, 3
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 1011, 1021–22 (2011); Ad Hoc Tribunals, INT’L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS
(Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ad-hoc-tribunals.
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shortcomings.78 With regard to accountability for crimes committed by
Kosovar defendants, the ICTY’s legacy was particularly underwhelming. It
had indicted only a handful of KLA defendants and had acquitted almost all
of them.79 Moreover, the majority of people living within the Former
Yugoslavia refused to accept the ICTY’s judgments as legitimate, largely
due to a lack of ownership in the judicial process, as well as the fact that the
Court was “removed physically, culturally, and politically from those who
would live most intimately with its success or failure.”80
B. The United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)
Regulation 64 Panels
In 1999, the UN, by Security Council Resolution 1244, established
UNMIK, a temporary transitional government charged with promoting
peace, security, stability, and respect for human rights in Kosovo and the
greater region.81 The head of UNMIK interpreted its mandate to provide it
with the authority to exercise “all legislative and executive authority with
respect to Kosovo.”82 UN officials further recognized their responsibility to
“re-establish the justice sector . . . [and] seek accountability for war crimes
and other atrocities committed during and after the conflict.”83 As UNMIK
worked to help rebuild Kosovo, it aided the ICTY with investigations and
even transferred cases from Kosovo’s domestic courts to the ICTY.84 Since
the ICTY ultimately chose not to pursue Kosovo cases beyond the Limaj and
Haradinaj cases, a domestic program in Kosovo was needed to try the
surplus of unprosecuted cases relating to atrocities committed during and
after the Kosovo War.85
To step into the vacuum the Kosovo War had left in the state’s justice
sector, UNMIK initially established an emergency justice system, composed
of local judges and prosecutors.86 However, this system was immediately

78. Visoka, supra note 1, at 14; Ochs, supra note 32, at 358.
79. Filip Rudic et al., Hague Tribunal Closes Down, Leaving Disputed Legacy, BALKAN
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://balkaninsight.com/2017/12/21/hague-tribunal-closesdown-leaving-disputed-legacy-12-20-2017/ (noting that Hajradin Bala was the only KLA member
convicted by the ICTY, while key KLA figures Fatmir Limaj and Ramush Haradinaj were acquitted).
80. Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 273 (internal citations omitted).
81. S.C. Res. 1244, ¶ 9 (June 10, 1999); Mandate, U.N. MISSION IN KOS.,
https://unmik.unmissions.org/mandate (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
82. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 536 (internal citations omitted).
83. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 9.
84. Id. at 29.
85. Id. at 12.
86. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 537.
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plagued by ethnic biases and a general lack of legal capacity to handle war
crimes cases.87 In response, without consulting the local Kosovar population,
UNMIK implemented an evolving process to inject international governance
and participation into Kosovo’s judicial system and to remove ethnic Serbian
and Albanian judges from participating in controversial war crimes cases.88
The process culminated in UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, passed in December
2000, which permitted the head of UNMIK to establish three-judge panels
composed of a majority of international judges to handle these cases, as well
as to assign international prosecutors to appear before the panels.89 The
panels became known as the Regulation 64 Panels and could be created
either by the head of UNMIK on his own motion, or by request of the
prosecutor, defense counsel, or even the accused himself.90
1. UNMIK’s Mandate, Jurisdiction and Proceedings
As hybrid panels situated within the Kosovo domestic judicial system
but staffed with a mix of international and domestic judges and lawyers,91
the Regulation 64 Panels applied the same laws as the Kosovar courts.92 This
in itself proved problematic, with ethnic Albanians disputing the
applicability of the Former Yugoslavia Serbian law in Kosovo.93 Ultimately,
UNMIK declared the law to be applied by the Regulation 64 Panels to be the
law in force in Kosovo prior to March 1989 to the extent that it did not
directly conflict with international human rights standards.94 This provided
limitations to the Regulation 64 Panels’ jurisdictional reach. Only war crimes
and genocide—not crimes against humanity—were encompassed in pre1989 domestic law in Kosovo.95
The ICTY and Regulation 64 Panels largely operated in parallel fashion
during this time, with their relationship often described as “collaborative” or
“complementary.”96 The ICTY maintained concurrent and primary

87. Id. at 537–38.
88. Id. at 538; PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 12–13.
89. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 13–14.
90. Id.; OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 538.
91. Ending Impunity in Kosovo: Closing the Accountability Gap for Crimes Committed During the
Kosovo Conflict: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 116th Cong. 8–9 (2019) (statement of
Paul Williams) [hereinafter Williams Testimony].
92. MICHAEL E. HARTMANN, INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS IN KOSOVO: A NEW
MODEL FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACEKEEPING 11 (2003).
93. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 22.
94. Id.
95. Id.68
96. Id.68 at 29.
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jurisdiction over national courts concerning atrocity crimes,97 but the ICTY
prosecutors focused primarily on the most senior perpetrators, while the
Regulation 64 Panels focused on prosecuting lower-level perpetrators of war
crimes.98
From the outset, the Panels faced complications. A procedural loophole
in the Regulation 64 language allowed local prosecutors to circumvent the
Regulation 64 Panels’ jurisdiction by instituting and abandoning cases
before domestic courts.99 While UNMIK eventually passed another
regulation closing this loophole, it was insufficient to provide redress in the
many cases abandoned prior to its enactment.100
2. UNMIK’s Transition and Legacy
UNMIK’s involvement with the Kosovo judiciary ended in December
2008, with the Regulation 64 Panels winding down and transferring the
remainder of responsibility, including over one thousand war crimes cases,
to UNMIK’s successor, EULEX.101 While the Regulation 64 Panels opened
over a thousand case files during UNMIK’s mandate, they engaged in a
relatively minimal amount of prosecutions, and by 2008, had completed only
37 war crimes cases.102 As of March 2006, only 10 percent of the cases
prosecuted by the Regulation 64 Panels involved war crimes; the rest
involved violations of domestic Kosovo law.103 The Regulation 64 Panels
faced serious “difficulties in obtaining reliable statistics of war crimes cases
. . . due to the number of different authorities and institutions engaged in this
area,” and UNMIK itself admitted that the Panels systemically failed to
adjudicate war crimes cases.104
In addition to its sub-optimal accountability achievements, UNMIK
also largely failed to garner public favor in Kosovo. Prior to passing
Regulation 64, UNMIK did not explain to the local population—including
local judges and attorneys—its reasons for creating the Regulation 64 Panels,
97. AMNESTY INT’L, KOSOVO: TIME FOR EULEX TO PRIORITIZE WAR CRIMES 9 (2012),
https://www.amnesty.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/260412_EULEX_Report.pdf.
98. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 29.
99. Adam Day, No Exit Without Judiciary: Learning a Lesson from UNMIK’s Transitional
Administration in Kosovo, 23 Wis. Int’l L.J. 183, 189 (2005).
100. Id.
101. Martina Spernbauer, EULEX Kosovo: The Difficult Deployment and Challenging
Implementation of the Most Comprehensive Civilian EU Operation to Date, 11 GERMAN L.J. 769, 781
(2010); Erika de Wet, The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the
Establishment and Functioning of EULEX, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 83, 89 (2009).
102. Williams Testimony, supra note 91, at 9.
103. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 22.
104. ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR., supra note 69, at 6.
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which essentially took high-profile war crimes cases out of the hands of local
judges and lawyers.105 As a result, many local judges were resentful of
UNMIK and refused to be recruited for the Panels, which had the practical
impact of “disenfranchising local judges and prosecutors from the most
important criminal cases and replacing them” with international judges and
prosecutors.106
C. The European Union Rule of Law in Kosovo (EULEX) Courts
As Kosovo officially declared its independence in 2008 and proceeded
towards self-governance, EULEX emerged to take over the duties previously
performed by UNMIK and to provide assistance in this period of
transition.107 In November 2008, the EU deployed EULEX, and UNMIK
officially transferred all control of the judiciary over to EULEX in hopes that
it would be able to pick up where the Regulation 64 Panels left off.108 While
UNMIK was all-encompassing and involved in every facet of life and society
in Kosovo, EULEX narrowed its scope to focus on the country’s law
enforcement and judiciary.109
1. EULEX’s Mandate and Jurisdiction
Like UNMIK, EULEX has worked pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolution 1244, which provides a framework for authorizing an
international civilian and military presence in Kosovo to serve as a
transitional administration.110 In February 2008, the EU specifically
bestowed EULEX with a mandate to assist Kosovo judicial authorities and
law enforcement agencies and to strengthen “an independent multi-ethnic
justice system.”111 As part of this mandate, EULEX was specifically tasked
with:
[E]nsur[ing] that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organised crime,
corruption, inter-ethnic crimes, financial/economic crimes and other
serious crimes are properly investigated, prosecuted, adjudicated and
enforced, according to the applicable law, including, where appropriate,
by international investigators, prosecutors and judges jointly with Kosovo
investigators, prosecutors and judges or independently, and by measures
including, as appropriate, the creation of cooperation and coordination
105. David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, Human Rights in Transition: The Disempowerment of Human
Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 130 (2003).
106. Day, supra note 99, at 190.
107. de Wet, supra note 101, at 83.
108. Muharemmi, supra note 25, at 972.
109. Spernbauer, supra note 101, at 784.
110. ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR., supra note 69, at 14.
111. Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 42) 92.
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structures between police and prosecution authorities.112

EULEX specifically focused on investigating and prosecuting serious
and sensitive crimes.113 Similar to its Regulation 64 Panels predecessor, war
crimes trials took place in Kosovo’s domestic court system and were heard
by mixed panels composed of international EULEX judges and local
Kosovar judges and presided over by a EULEX judge.114 These panels,
known as EULEX Courts, shared jurisdiction with Kosovo’s Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office, which is responsible for investigating and prosecuting
the country’s most serious criminal offenses, including terrorism, organized
crime, and inter-ethnic violence.115
Of the 1,200 cases inherited from UNMIK, EULEX Courts closed or
dismissed 500, and by 2013, they had completed only fifteen trials.116 Most
notable of the cases handled by EULEX Courts were the Drenica Group
Cases. In 2014, authorities arrested seventeen individuals believed to be
members of the Drenica Group, a high-level organization within the KLA.117
At the trial court level, the EULEX Court split the case into two trials, with
Drenica Group Case I involving seven defendants, and Drenica Group Case
II involving ten.118 The charges in both cases related to allegations that the
KLA operated a detention center at which the defendants committed various
war crimes including torture, humiliating and degrading treatment, and
murder in 1998.119 Following trial, in May 2014, the EULEX Court
convicted two defendants in Drenica Group Case I of war crimes and
acquitted the remaining defendants,120 and convicted all ten defendants of
various war crimes in Drenica Group Case II.121 These convictions were
mostly upheld by a EULEX majority-led panel of judges in Kosovo’s
Appellate Court, although the appellate panel did modify many of the

112. Id. art. 3(d).
113. Short History of EULEX, EULEX, https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,44,197 (last visited
May 10, 2020) (citing Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP supra note 111, art. 3(d)).
114. Spernbauer, supra note 101, at 792; ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR., supra note 69, at 14.
115. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 97, at 24.
116. Muharremi, supra note 25, at 298; Bernd Borchardt, EULEX Press Release, EULEX and War
Crimes (June 14, 2013), https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,10,1513.
117. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2014, at 3 (2014).
118. Id. at 3–4.
119. Press Release, EULEX, Drenica 1 Verdict (May 27, 2015), https://www.eulexkosovo.eu/?page=2,10,228 [hereinafter Drenica 1 Verdict]; Press Release, EULEX, Drenica 2 Verdict,
(May 27, 2015), https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page= 2,10,229 [hereinafter Drenica 2 Verdict].
120. Drenica 1 Verdict, supra note 119.
121. Drenica 2 Verdict, supra note 119.
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criminal sentences.122 EULEX prosecutors marked these cases as a
significant step towards achieving justice for war crimes in Kosovo.123
In 2012, EULEX began phasing out its involvement in domestic war
crimes prosecutions and began transferring its powers to Kosovo’s domestic
judicial system.124 With the extension of its mandate in 2014, EULEX
changed the composition of court panels from a majority of international
judges to a majority of Kosovar judges and a minority of international
judges.125 In addition, pursuant to the 2014 mandate extension, EULEX
would no longer accept new cases and would begin gradually handing over
all judicial competencies to Kosovo’s domestic judiciary.126
2. EULEX’s Legacy and Transition
During its wind-down period, EULEX continued to work in the
country, transferring much of the power of international EULEX judges back
to domestic institutions, while continuing to monitor domestic courts and
cases.127 In June 2018, with the conclusion of most of its executive mandates,
EULEX concluded its investigative and prosecutorial responsibilities and
ceased providing international judges for the Kosovo justice system.128
EULEX ultimately transferred most cases involving war crimes and other
breaches of international law to the newly created KSC.129 At the time of
publication, EULEX continues to operate in Kosovo pursuant to a narrow
mandate that permits EULEX to monitor select criminal and civil cases,
mentor and advise the Kosovo Correctional Service, and provide support to
the KSC.130
122. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2016, at 2–3 (2016).
123. Marija Ristic, EULEX Denies Drenica Group Verdict Was ‘Political’, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL
JUST. (June 1, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://balkaninsight.com/2015/06/01/eulex-drenica-group-verdict-wasnot-political/.
124. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 551.
125. EULEX, supra note 113.
126. Id. One exception to this policy was in North Kosovo, EULEX determined that it would “remain
in charge of judicial proceedings until the EU Facilitated Dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade brings
a solution for the judiciary.” Id.
127. Serbeze Haxhiaj, Kosovo Faces Judicial Dilemmas as EU Law Mission Ends, BALKAN
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Apr. 13, 2018, 8:56 AM), https://balkaninsight.com/2018/04/13/kosovo-facesjudicial-dilemmas-as-eu-law-mission-ends-04-12-2018/.
128. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUM. RTS. AND LAB., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2018, at 2–3 (2018) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE. 2018 COUNTRY
REPORTS].
129. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 568.
130. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE. 2018 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 128, at 2–3. The mandate was most
recently extended to June 2021. Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/792, 2020 O.J. (L. 193) 10.
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EULEX’s operations were met with a mixed reception within Kosovo.
In the opinion of one observer, EULEX failed to substantially improve
respect for the rule of law within Kosovo and did not meet expectations “to
bring justice to key perpetrators of war crimes and corruption.”131
Specifically, the EULEX Courts’ decisions in the Drenica Group Cases—
which were lauded by EULEX prosecutors as great achievements towards
justice—sparked significant public backlash throughout the country.132 The
reactions to the Drenica Group Cases’ verdicts revealed a stark difference in
opinion between international actors in the region and locals, with
international actors viewing many of the accused as perpetrators of grave
breaches of international law and locals supporting the former KLA
members as heroic freedom fighters of the Kosovo War.133 In addition,
EULEX’s reputation, both in and outside Kosovo, was hampered by several
high-profile corruption allegations made by EULEX judges and prosecutors
that EULEX senior staff were accepting bribes and colluding with
defendants.134
3. Collective Criticisms
Despite their relative successes, the ICTY, Regulation 64 Panels, and
EULEX Courts all faced similar criticisms for their failure to achieve goals
pertaining to accountability and transitional justice in Kosovo. While these
criticisms are fairly extensive, all three judicial mechanisms faced backlash
for issues pertaining to broadscale legitimacy challenges stemming from a
lack of local involvement, failure to acquire sufficient evidence to complete
successful proceedings, and widespread witness and judicial intimidation.
This section will address these three criticisms—all of which also threaten
the KSC’s work—in turn.
Each of the three internationalized courts created to address Kosovo’s
war crimes have encountered significant challenges to their legitimacy.135
This lack of legitimacy can be traced back to the lack of local involvement
in each of the three mechanisms. Of all three courts designed to prosecute
131. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 562.
132. See Ristic, supra note 123 (explaining that the EULEX trial court panels’ verdicts in the two
cases sparked street protests and elicited a number of harsh reactions from politicians, including then
Foreign Minister and later President of Kosovo Hashim Thaçi, who stated that the verdicts “put in doubt
the goal of justice”).
133. Id.
134. Drini Grazhdani, Is EULEX a Step Back for International Rule of Law Missions, HARV. INT’L
L.J. ONLINE, https://harvardilj.org/2019/08/is-eulex-a-step-back-for-international-rule-of-law-missions/
(last visited Jan. 14, 2021).
135. Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 268–69.
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crimes committed during the Kosovo War, the ICTY had the least local
involvement. Kosovo was in no way involved in the Court’s creation or
operations; the ICTY was staffed exclusively by international lawyers,
judges, and personnel, and sat in The Hague.136 Moreover, the ICTY’s
outreach programs were largely insufficient to connect with victims in the
Balkans.137 The ICTY’s lack of local connection made many in the Balkans,
from all ethnic groups, view the Court and its decisions as “alien” and
“ultimately illegitimate.”138
As previously discussed, despite UNMIK’s inclusion of some local
judges on its Regulation 64 Panels, UNMIK’s judicial operations were also
largely met with opposition and hostility from local lawyers and judges. In
part, because of the failure to incorporate local involvement and ownership
in the Regulation 64 Panels’ creation and operation, scholars recognize that
the Panels, and UNMIK more generally, “fail[ed] to foster respect for legal
institutions and the rule of law.”139
When EULEX took over UNMIK’s judicial work, it inherited the
difficult task of building trust within Kosovo and presenting itself as
politically independent from the Kosovo Government—which was then
composed of many KLA members.140 EULEX struggled to find legitimacy
in the eyes of Kosovars, largely due to the lack of transparency in its
operations and decisions and the repeated allegations of corruption and
bribery among EULEX leadership.141 Likewise, much of the local Kosovar
population—both ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians—viewed EULEX, as a
whole, as ineffective and biased.142 A 2015 report conducted by the Kosovar
Centre for Security Studies of public opinion within Kosovo concluded that
54 percent of respondents did not trust EULEX, meaning that the Kosovar

136. Ochs, supra note 32, at 359.
137. Jane E. Stromseth, Pursuing Accountability for Atrocities After Conflict: What Impact on
Building the Rule of Law, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 251, 274 (2007); Varda Hussain, Sustaining Judicial
Rescues: The Role of Outreach and Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT’L
L. 547, 563 (2005) (describing the ICTY’s outreach efforts as “a much-delayed afterthought”).
138. Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 268.
139. Marshall & Inglis, supra note 105, at 130.
140. Marija Ristic, Can the New Kosovo Court Keep Witnesses Safe?, BALKANS INSIGHT (Jan. 20,
2016, 9:25 AM), https://balkaninsight.com/2016/01/20/can-the-new-kosovo-court-keep-witnesses-safe01-20-2016/#gsc.tab=0.
141. Naim Rashiti, Ten Years After Eulex: Key Principles for Future EU Flagship Initiatives on the
Rule of Law 7 (CEPS Paper in Liberty and Sec. in Eur., No. 2019-07, 2019), https://www.ceps.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/LSE2019-07_Ten-years-after-EULEX.pdf.pdf.
142. Ewa Mahr, Differences in the Local Perception of EULEX and KFOR in Their Security-Related
Tasks, 30 EUR. SEC. 43, 55 (2020).
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public trusted EULEX less than Kosovo’s domestic judicial system.143
All of the internationalized courts involved in prosecuting crimes
committed during the Kosovo War have also encountered well-documented
challenges pertaining to witness and judicial tampering and intimidation.144
Witness intimidation is a significant challenge in Kosovo, with experts
recognizing that such conduct is a “way of life” in the country.145 Much of
this stems from the “clan mentality” present throughout Kosovo, and the fact
that witnesses who testify against their own ethnic group run the risk of being
ostracized by their community.146 Moreover, Kosovo’s small territory,
combined with the fact that many Kosovars know each other makes it
extremely difficult for courts to hide witnesses’ identities.147
Beginning with the ICTY, witnesses were often reluctant to testify or
provide evidence against KLA members because of fears for their safety.148
In the Haradinaj Case specifically, witness intimidation proved to be a
significant challenge for the prosecution.149 The Appeals Chamber granted
the Prosecutor’s first appeal of the defendants’ acquittals finding that there
existed a context of “serious witness intimidation” at the trial level and that
the Trial Chamber “seriously erred in failing to take adequate measures to
secure the testimony of certain witnesses.”150 A 2016 study conducted by the
ICTY’s Victims and Witnesses Section concluded that one in seven
witnesses who testified before the ICTY had been “contacted to prevent them
from testifying or threatened because of their testimony[.]”151
UNMIK’s Regulation 64 Panels and the EULEX Courts were also
143. KOSOVAR CTR. FOR SEC. STUD., KOSOVO SECURITY BAROMETER 11 (5th ed. 2015),
https://perma.cc/72SH-M6QV.
144. Ristic, supra note 140; ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR., WITNESS SECURITY AND
PROTECTION IN KOSOVO: ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2007).
145. Dean B. Pineles, Life Beyond the Vermont Trial Bench: Tales from Kosovo, 43 VT. BAR J. 23,
25 (2017).
146. COUNCIL OF EUR., COMM. ON LEGAL AFF. & HUM. RTS., REP. NO. 12462, INHUMAN
TREATMENT OF PEOPLE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF HUMAN ORGANS IN KOSOVO 26 (2010)
[hereinafter MARTY REPORT]; Marija Ristic, New Kosovo Court Confronts Witness Protection Fears,
JUST. HUB (Oct. 2, 2016), https://justicehub.org/article/new-kosovo-court-confronts-witness-protectionfears/.
147. Ristic, supra note 140.
148. Id.
149. Andrew Trotter, Witness Intimidation in International Trials: Balancing the Need for Protection
Against the Rights of the Accused, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 526 (2012).
150. Int’l Crim. Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgement Summary for Haradinaj et al., (July
21, 2010), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/acjug/en/100721_summary.pdf.
151. CASTLEBERRY PEACE INST., ECHOES OF TESTIMONIES: A PILOT STUDY INTO THE LONG-TERM
ICTY
4
(2016),
IMPACT
OF
BEARING
WITNESS
BEFORE
THE
https://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Registry/Witnesses/Echoes-Exec-Summary_EN.pdf.
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plagued by witness tampering and judicial intimidation. Local judges seated
on the Regulation 64 Panels—who did not receive the same level of security
as their international counterparts—reported receiving threats of violence
while serving on the Panels, especially when presiding over cases involving
high-ranking KLA members.152 Former ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
has accused UNMIK officials of giving into this intimidation by disclosing
sensitive witness information to defendants.153 While UNMIK denied these
charges, it did admit to stopping several investigations into high-level KLA
perpetrators for “political reasons.”154 Given the pervasiveness of witness
and judicial intimidation before all three internationalized courts, one former
EULEX judge has predicted that these challenges will continue to plague any
court designed to prosecute KLA crimes, regardless of where the court is
located.155
In part because of this extensive witness and judicial intimidation, the
Regulation 64 Panels and EULEX Courts faced significant obstacles in
obtaining evidence.156 Given the unstable environment in Kosovo in the early
2000s, UNMIK failed to prioritize war crimes cases, instead focusing on
punishing the daily crime that occurred in the new state.157 Since war crimes
cases were never prioritized, by the time such crimes were ultimately
investigated, significant time had passed since the crimes’ commission,
presenting considerable concerns regarding the availability of evidence.158 In
the time that had passed prior to investigation, many victims and witnesses
had passed away or fled the country, while others’ memories had faded.159
Issues also arose regarding the misplacement and destruction of
evidence, as well as a lack of consistent handovers of evidence from the
different prosecutorial and judicial actors—such as the ICTY, UNMIK, and
EULEX—that had been operating in the country.160 For instance, many of
the files turned over from UNMIK to EULEX, including those investigating
allegations of war crimes committed by KLA members, were in “deplorable
condition,” with “mislaid evidence and witness statements,” and “long time
152.
153.
154.
155.

ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOP. IN EUR., supra note 69, at 26.
Ristic, supra note 140.
Id.
See Dean B. Pineles, ‘Ghost Court’ Delays Justice for Kosovo War Victims, BALKAN
TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:04 AM), https://balkaninsight.com/2018/03/21/ghost-courtdelays-justice-for-kosovo-war-victims-03-19-2018/#gsc.tab=0.
156. PERRIELLO & WIERDA, supra note 68, at 22.
157. ORG. FOR SEC. & COOP. IN EUR., supra note 69, at 21.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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lapses in following up on incomplete investigative steps.”161
IV. THE KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS
In April 2008, Carla Del Ponte, the former ICTY Chief Prosecutor,
claimed in her memoir that during the Kosovo War, members of the KLA
had committed grave human rights violations.162 Del Ponte specifically
accused KLA fighters of kidnapping ethnic Serbs, holding them in prison
facilities in Kosovo and Albania, and transferring them to other regions of
Albania, where they would “harvest” and traffic human body parts.163 She
further alleged that while the KLA held these detainees in custody, KLA
members would subject them to serious abuse, torture, and, in some
instances, murder.164
Following Del Ponte’s accusations, the Council of Europe’s Committee
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights appointed Dick Marty, a Council of
Europe rapporteur, to open and complete an investigation into these
allegations.165 The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly approved
the Commission’s 2010 report, issued at the conclusion of the investigation
and colloquially named the “Marty Report.”166 The Marty Report
corroborated Del Ponte’s assertions that KLA members had engaged in
killings, forced detentions, and, on a much smaller scale, organ trafficking
during and following the Kosovo War.167 The report also noted the presence
of ongoing organized crime in Kosovo conducted by the Drenica Group—
the same group previously prosecuted by EULEX—which was composed of
and run by key former KLA members, many of whom had gone on to
become leading political figures, including Hashim Thaçi, Kosovo’s then
Prime Minister and later President of Kosovo.168
After the Marty Report’s publication, EULEX established a Special
Investigative Task Force (SITF) in September 2011 to investigate the alleged
crimes referenced in the Marty Report and other related crimes.169 Following
161. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 560.
162. Ian Traynor, Former War Crimes Prosecutor Alleges Kosovan Army Harvested Organs From
(Apr.
11,
2008,
7:06
PM)
Serb
Prisoners,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/12/warcrimes.kosovo.
163. Id.
164. Dean Pineles, Kosovo: International Criminal Justice in Slow Motion, 46 VT. BAR J. 38, 39
(2020).
165. MARTY REPORT, supra note 146, at 6.
166. Id. at 1; Muharremi, supra note 22, at 971.
167. Pineles, supra note 164, at 40.
168. MARTY REPORT, supra note 146, at 14–18; Pineles, supra note 164, at 40.
169. Background, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS AND SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF.,
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several years of investigation, in 2014, the SITF confirmed that between
1999 and 2000, the KLA engaged in a “campaign of persecution,” seeking
revenge against Serbs and other ethnic minority populations for Serbian
crimes committed during the Kosovo War, as well as those Kosovar
Albanians who the KLA viewed as Serb collaborators or political
opponents.170 Within this campaign, which the SITF found was sanctioned
by “top levels of the KLA leadership,” KLA members allegedly engaged in
forcible displacement of individuals from their homes, abductions, illegal
detentions in camps in Kosovo and neighboring Albania, forced
disappearances, unlawful killings, sexual violence, and—in certain cases—
organ trafficking.171 The SITF ultimately concluded that the evidence
obtained was sufficient to support indictments against several senior KLA
officials for war crimes and violations of domestic Kosovo law, including
murder.172
A. Creation
Internationalization pervaded the creation of the KSC from the time the
SITF commenced its investigation in 2011. From its origination, the SITF
derived its legal authority from EULEX, rather than from Kosovo law.173 In
mid-2012, partway through the SITF’s investigation, Kosovo became a fully
independent nation, and shortly thereafter, the President of Kosovo invited
the EU High Representative to continue EULEX’s presence in Kosovo,
thereby legitimating the SITF and its investigation.174 This had the added
effect of providing the SITF a “special status within Kosovo’s prosecutorial
system outside the authority and control of Kosovo.”175
From that point forward, the EU directly led efforts for the creation of
a specialist court and its prosecutor’s office.176 Almost immediately, many
Kosovar politicians—especially those from Kosovo Albanian political
parties—opposed the creation of a specialist court, and this opposition only
grew as the EU continued to express dominance in the Court’s negotiation.177
While the creation of the court ostensibly aimed to involve collaboration
https://www.scp-ks.org/en/background (last visited May 1, 2020).
170. SITF Statement, supra note 12, at 1–2 (July 29, 2014), https://www.recom.link/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/Download-full-statement-here.pdf.
171. Id. at 2–3.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Muharremi, supra note 22, at 972.
174. Id. at 972.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 973.
177. Id. at 975–76.
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between Kosovo and the EU, sources later disclosed that the EU alone—
without involvement from Kosovar officials—prepared the draft legislation
to create the KSC and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office.178 Once the EU
submitted the proposed legislation to the Kosovo Assembly, the Assembly
was permitted only to vote to approve or reject the legislation in whole; it
was not entitled to propose modifications to the legislation.179
In part because of this lack of power, the Kosovo Assembly did not
garner enough support to adopt the constitutional amendments needed to
create a legally constitutional specialist chambers.180 In addition to
contentious parliamentary debates, large protests occurred in the streets of
Kosovo against the creation of the Court.181 Despite the lack of parliamentary
and public support for the Court, the international community, including the
EU and the United States, exerted great political pressure on Kosovo and its
leaders to adopt the amendments.182 As Robert Muharremi notes, the Kosovo
Government was informed that a failure to approve the constitutional
amendments and draft KSC Law would significantly impair Kosovo’s EU
integration process, as well as its other high-profile policy goals pertaining
to its recognition by the international community as an independent state.183
Seemingly left with few other options, on August 3, 2015, the Kosovo
Assembly approved the amendment and adopted the Law on the Specialist
Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (the KSC Law).184 In
September 2016, the SITF’s mandate and staff was transferred from EULEX
control to the KSC in The Hague.185
B. Mandate, Jurisdiction, and Organizational Structure
The KSC Law functions as the governing legal framework for the
Specialist Chambers and its prosecutorial unit.186 The KSC Law tasks the
KSC with adjudicating the crimes identified in the Marty Report and the
SITF’s investigation, as well as related crimes.187 While the KSC Law never
178. Id. at 976.
179. Id.
180. Muharremi, supra note 22, at 976.
181. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 26–27.
182. Id. at 27 (referencing a 2018 statement by Hashim Thaçi saying he only agreed to the
amendment because he was “under great pressure from the international community”).
183. Muharremi, supra note 22, at 977.
184. KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR’S OFF., supra note 169.
185. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 568.
186. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 1(2) (Kos.);
OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 568.
187. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 1(2) (Kos.).
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expressly mentions the KLA, it can be inferred from both the Marty Report
and the SITF’s investigation that the work of the KSC and the Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office will primarily involve the alleged crimes committed by
KLA members.188 The KSC Law further provides that the Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office shall take over the SITF’s mandate and personnel and
conduct their investigations and prosecutions of the crimes falling within the
KSC’s jurisdiction independently of the Chambers’ work.189
The KSC Law provides the Chambers with jurisdiction over crimes
committed between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 2000, “which were
either commenced or committed in Kosovo.”190 The Chambers’ personal
jurisdiction is further limited to citizens of Kosovo and the Former
Yugoslavia or persons who have committed crimes against persons of
Kosovar or Former Yugoslavian citizenship.191 The KSC’s substantive
jurisdiction encompasses crimes under both international and domestic
Kosovo law, including crimes against humanity and war crimes recognized
under international law,192 as well as select crimes recognized under Kosovo
law.193 The Chambers’ judges are directed to apply international law,
including customary international law and jurisprudence from other
international criminal tribunals, 194 but Kosovo law must guide sentencing
decisions.195
The KSC is attached to each level of the Kosovo court system and is
composed of a Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber, Supreme Court Chamber,
and Constitutional Court Chamber,196 with a single judge who performs the
functions of a pretrial chamber.197 A selection panel of three international
members, with at least two judges who have significant international
criminal law experience, is responsible for creating a roster of international
judges recommended for KSC judgeships.198 The head of EULEX will
188. Robert Muharremi, The Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, AM.
SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHT (May 26, 2016), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/20/issue/11/kosovospecialist-chambers-and-specialist-prosecutors-office.
189. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 24(2) (Kos.).
190. Id. arts. 7–8.
191. Id. art. 9.
192. Id. arts. 13–14.
193. Id. art. 15.
194. Id. art. 3, ¶ 2 (noting that the Kosovo Constitution gives customary international law superiority
over domestic law); OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 569.
195. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 44, ¶¶ 2–4
(Kos.).
196. Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.
197. Id. art. 25, ¶ 1.
198. Id. art. 28, ¶¶ 1–2.
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officially appoint judges from the roster prepared by the selection panel.199
The head of EULEX also appoints the KSC’s President and Vice President
from among the KSC judges, based on the selection panel’s
recommendation.200 While the President serves the KSC on a full-time
basis,201 all other judges may perform their functions remotely, and need only
be present at The Hague when deemed necessary by the President.202 In 2017,
the head of EULEX appointed nineteen KSC judges, all of whom came from
Europe or North America.203 Presently, twenty-two judges hold positions on
the KSC judge’s roster, all continuing to hail from North America and
Europe.204
Despite the KSC’s “attachment” to the national court system, it
operates completely independently from Kosovo domestic courts, and in
practice, the relationship between the KSC and the national courts is largely
“nonexistent.”205 In fact, other than the KSC’s positioning within the Kosovo
court system, and its application—in part—of Kosovo domestic law, most
of its other features are purely international. While the KSC Law provides
the Chambers with a seat in Kosovo, it primarily sits in The Hague, and has
never publicly stated an intent to sit in Kosovo.206 Pursuant to prior
agreement between the Kosovo President and the EU, the Chambers must
exclusively employ international judges and staff.207 Likewise, the Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office will also be staffed with international attorneys and
personnel.208 The KSC is thus the first among hybrid and “internationalized”
courts not to employ state or regional staff.209
199. Id. art. 28, ¶ 3; OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 571.
200. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 32, ¶¶ 1, 4
(Kos.).
201. Id. art. 32, ¶ 1.
202. Id. art. 26, ¶ 2.
203. Appointment of Kosovo Specialist Chambers Judges, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS AND
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR’S OFF. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.scp-ks.org/en/appointment-kosovo-specialistchambers-judges.
204. Chambers, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS AND SPECIAL PROSECUTOR’S OFF., https://www.scpks.org/en/specialist-chambers/chambers (last visited Jan. 21, 2021).
205. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 569. However, it should be noted that the KSC has the
power to order that domestic courts transfer cases to the KSC—at any time in proceedings—should the
case fall within KSC jurisdiction. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No.
05/L-053, art. 10 (Kos.).
206. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 3, ¶ 6 (Kos.).
See generally Host Agreement, supra note 20 (establishing the Netherlands as a host for the Kosovo
Specialist Chambers).
207. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 569–70.
208. Williams, supra note 21, at 35.
209. OPTIONS FOR JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 569.
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In 2020, the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor’s Office began initiating
proceedings.210 As of the time of publication, the Prosecutor’s Office has
indicted eight defendants across four different cases.211
V. A NEW BREED OF HYBRID TRIBUNAL
The KSC represents a new breed of hybrid tribunal in that while it is
created by and applies domestic Kosovo law and is ostensibly “attached” to
the domestic Kosovar judicial system, it is driven and operated almost
exclusively by international powers.212 Stylizing the KSC as an
internationalized hybrid court presents significant concerns for the
effectiveness of the Court and its limited ability to enact transitional justice
within Kosovo, and, more broadly, for the future of the hybrid model of
prosecution.
While the crimes within the KSC’s mandate deserve prosecution, using
nearly exclusively internationalized entities to prosecute these crimes has
proven unsuccessful. Instead, efforts should be made to incorporate local
voices, involvement, and ownership over judicial operations. Only by
incorporating local ownership into the KSC will many of the idealized goals
of the hybrid model of justice—notably legitimacy, capacity building, and
transitional justice—be realized.
This section will first analyze why the circumstances present in Kosovo
in 2015 did not lend themselves to the effective creation of a hybrid tribunal.
It will then examine how the KSC’s internationalized structure and
composition will undermine the potential that the Court—as a hybrid
tribunal—could provide retributive or transitional justice to the local
Kosovar community. This section will then conclude by addressing the
potential consequences the operation of the KSC as an internationalized
hybrid tribunal can pose to the future of the hybrid model.
A. Flawed Circumstances for a Hybrid Court
A study of previous hybrid courts evidences that despite the vast
benefits afforded by the use of hybrid mechanisms, they must be used
selectively, as they can only truly succeed in specific circumstances.213 In
210. Specialist Prosecutor Formally Notifies of Intent to Initiate Proceedings, KOS. SPECIALIST
CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF. (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.scp-ks.org/en/specialistprosecutor-formally-notifies-intent-initiate-proceedings.
211. Cases, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S OFF., https://www.scpks.org/en/cases (last visited Aug. 11, 2021).
212. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 3 (Kos.).
213. Ochs, supra note 32, at 401.
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order to achieve success—both in terms of accountability and legitimacy—
a hybrid court needs to earn the support of the state it is designed to serve,
including both civilian support and the political support of the state’s
government.214 Moreover, a hybrid court should be utilized to complement
the work of domestic courts and the ICC, or to step in to handle prosecutions
when either of those systems are improper or inadequate for prosecuting the
crimes at issue; a hybrid court should not be used to prosecute crimes that
could and should have been prosecuted by preceding domestic or
international courts, especially when those courts are also hybrid courts.
These requisite circumstances were absent in Kosovo at the time of the
KSC’s creation. The citizens and government of Kosovo did not—and still
do not—want a new international court to prosecute KLA members.215
Moreover, the KSC is now the third attempt at a hybrid court to prosecute
the same set of crimes, which not only compromises its potential legitimacy,
but also fails to address the most systemic failings of the predecessor courts.
1. Lack of Local & Political Support
From its establishment, the KSC has lacked strong Kosovar support for
its mandate. The Dakar Guidelines on the Establishment of Hybrid Courts,
intended to provide strategic insight into the methodology of creating hybrid
courts, recognize that decisions on whether to establish a hybrid mechanism
need to be “responsive to national preferences” as to how the set of crimes
at issue should be prosecuted.216 The Guidelines further recognize that “any
sense of the imposition of justice from the outside, in particular from states
not willing to subject their nations to international(ised) justice mechanisms
can be counterproductive.”217 Moreover, David Crane, the former Chief
Prosecutor of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, has stated,
In considering how best to account for an atrocity in a region of the world,
the international community needs to ask itself: is the justice we seek the
justice they want? A justice not appreciated or understood by victims may
not be justice at all, and this can impact how that justice brings peace and
stability to a region.218
214. AARON FICHTELBERG, HYBRID TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION 180 (2015).
215. Pineles, supra note 164, at 42. (describing the harsh reality following the months of negotiating
the KSC mandate, which was filled with local street protests and delays due to political opposition); see
also Serbeze Haxhiaj, In Kosovo, Distrust of Hague War Crimes Court Simmers, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL
JUST. (May 12, 2020, 8:46 AM), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/12/in-kosovo-distrust-of-hague-warcrimes-court-simmers/ (explaining that even years after the adoption of the KSC, Albanians still view the
Court as unfair, and Serbians refuse to believe the KSC will actually bring any justice).
216. DAKAR GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at 9.
217. Id. at 2.
218. David M. Crane, Transitional Justice: War Crimes Tribunals and Establishing the Rule of Law
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Likewise, the political support of the target state in which a hybrid court
functions is essential for that court’s success.219 Without political support, a
hybrid court will face resistance and challenges at nearly every stage, from
investigations, to arrests, to judicial proceedings.220
In line with these principles, several of the hybrid courts to date,
including the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, were established through a
collaborative process between the target state and the international
community in response to the target state’s request for prosecutorial
assistance.221 These processes allowed for a “back and forth dialogue” in
which “the national government [could] assert the needs and wants of the
victimized society, while allowing the international community to ensure
that international standards of justice are met.”222 While the EU—the
international driving force behind the KSC—sought to exemplify the same
collaborative process in the KSC’s creation, the reality was far different. The
Kosovo Government was given little to no opportunity to modify the
legislation drafted by the EU, and therefore had little say in the KSC’s
structure, composition, and mandate.223 Moreover, political opposition to the
in Post-Conflict Countries: Speech: “Back to the Future”– Reflections on the Beginning of the Beginning:
International Criminal Law in the Twenty-First Century, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1761, 1768 (2009).
219. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., THE CHICAGO PRINCIPLES ON POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 10 (2007)
(“Meaningful post-conflict justice policies must have a high degree of legitimacy and require substantial
political will on the part of leaders inside and outside of the government.”); see also DAKAR GUIDELINES,
supra note 15, at 10 (identifying that in assessing whether a hybrid tribunal is proper to prosecute mass
atrocities, consideration of “whether or not the state in which the crimes were committed is willing and
able to engage in the process of setting up a tribunal … is crucial.”).
220. FICHTELBERG, supra note 214, at 180.
221. Van Schaack, supra note 17, at 191. The Special Court for Sierra Leone arose from the Sierra
Leonean Government’s request for UN Security Council assistance in prosecuting perpetrators involved
in atrocity crimes committed during the Sierra Leone Civil War. Permanent Rep. of Sierra Leone to the
U.N., Letter Dated Aug. 9, 2000 from the Permanent Rep. of Sierra Leone to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000). The Special
Court for Sierra Leone was ultimately established pursuant to a bilateral agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the UN in 2002. Agreement Between the United Nations and the
Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone,
Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137. Likewise, the negotiations for the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia stemmed from the Cambodian Prime Minister’s request to the UN and the United
States for assistance in prosecuting members of the Khmer Rouge regime. Sara L. Ochs, In Need of
Prosecution: The Role of Personal Jurisdiction in the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 55 STAN. J. INT’L L. 118,
125 (2019). The negotiations culminated in a bilateral agreement between the UN and the Royal
Government of Cambodia to establish the Court. Agreement Between the U.N. and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During the Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.
222. Raub, supra note 40, at 1043.
223. Muharremi, supra note 22, at 976.
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Court—both in the Kosovo Assembly’s initial “no” vote to the constitutional
amendment, and later in a 2017 attempt by Assembly members to revoke the
KSC224—was stifled by extensive international pressures from the EU and
other Western powers, who warned of “severe negative consequences”
should Kosovo continue to oppose the Court.225
By creating the KSC over the wishes of the Kosovo Government, the
international community imposed significant obstacles to the KSC and the
Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in investigating and prosecuting the crimes
within its mandate.226 This is especially the case as the KSC’s mandate is
unpalatable for many Kosovar citizens, specifically those Kosovar Albanians
who view KLA fighters as heroes. The mandate is rendered even more
controversial in that it targets sitting heads of state and parliamentary leaders
in the Kosovo Government. In June 2020, the Kosovo Specialist
Prosecutor’s Office publicly recognized that it had indicted sitting President
Hashim Thaçi227 and the head of the Democratic Party of Kosovo, Kadri
Veseli, for crimes against humanity and war crimes,228 marking the first time
that a hybrid court has indicted a sitting head of state.229 While there is no
question that bringing culpable state leaders to justice for murder,
persecution, and torture is imperative,230 attempting to do so through a hybrid
tribunal, which operates in part through the support of the local state
224. Keida Kostreci, Move to Abolish Kosovo War Crimes Court Rattles US, Other Western Allies,
VOA (Dec. 23, 2017, 9:52 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/kosovo-war-crimes-court-move-toabolish/4177068.html.
225. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 27–28 (quoting U.S. Embassy Pristina, Quint Member
States Statement, January 5, 2018, U.S. EMBASSY IN KOS. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://xk.usembassy.gov/quintmember-states-statement/.
226. See, e.g., AIDAN HEHIR, BALKAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING NETWORK, KOSOVO SPECIALIST
CHAMBERS: STEP TOWARDS JUSTICE OR POTENTIAL TIMEBOMB? 17–19 (2018) (describing challenges
that the KSC faces to implementing effective transitional justice).
227. President Thaçi resigned as President on November 5, 2020, to defend against the KSC charges.
Michael Birnbaum, Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi Resigns to Face War Crimes Charges in The Hague,
WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/kosovo-president-thaciresigns-war-crimes-hague/2020/11/05/c7054fe0-1f65-11eb-ad53-4c1fda49907d_story.html.
228. Kos. Specialist Prosecutor’s Off., Press Statement, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST
PROSECUTOR’S OFF. (June 24, 2020), https://www.scp-ks.org/en/press-statement.
229. However, the Extraordinary African Chambers, the mixed tribunal established in Senegal, was
successful in prosecuting and convicting former Chadian President, Hissène Habré. Q&A: The Case of
Hissène Habré before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 3, 2016,
6:00
AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/qa-case-hissene-habre-extraordinary-africanchambers-senegal; Hissene Habre, TRIAL INT’L (July 27, 2020), https://trialinternational.org/latestpost/hissene-habre/.
230. See Kos. Specialist Prosecutor’s Off., supra note 228 (noting that Thaçi and Veseli were
indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes “including murder, enforced disappearance of
persons, persecution, and torture”).
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government, is extremely difficult, especially when the local population is
largely supportive of the indicted head of state. By indicting sitting leaders,
the Prosecutor and the Court have rendered the chances of receiving any type
of political cooperation in their investigations and prosecutions unlikely.
Moreover, in failing to incorporate political dialogue and input into the
creation of the Court, the EU gives the impression of forcing justice on a
weak and nascent nation, which accurately reflects how the Kosovar public
perceives the Court. In a 2017 public perception study co-conducted by
PAX, the Centre for Peace and Tolerance, Impunity Watch, and Integra, 77.6
percent of ethnic Albanians surveyed believed that the Court was created
because of international pressure, which they viewed as unfair.231 Likewise,
ethnic Serbs surveyed generally believed that the impetus for the Court was
“the need of Kosovo’s international allies to ‘clean the hands’ of political
clients who emerged from the KLA and now hold positions of power,” rather
than a legitimate desire for justice.232 About half of those surveyed also
predicted that the KSC trials will be unfair since they will be conducted
outside of Kosovo by international judges and prosecutors.233
Further, the KSC does not intend to provide the type of justice sought
by many victims of the Kosovo War. The people of Kosovo seek
comprehensive justice “for all victims, regardless of ethnicity,” which the
predecessor courts failed to provide.234 The 2017 public perception study
concluded that both ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo desire justice for
crimes committed by all ethnic groups during and in the aftermath of the
Kosovo War, rather than just those committed by the KLA.235 By creating an
internationalized court that seeks justice for crimes committed by just one
militarized ethnic group, the KSC’s mandate fails to respond to the needs of
the Kosovar people and instead presents an appearance of politicized,

231. MICHAEL JAMES WARREN ET AL., PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS
13–14 (2017) [hereinafter “PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY”].
232. Id. at 14.
233. VISOKA, supra note 1, at 27.
234. Press Release, Security Council, Attempts to Repeal Law on Kosovo Chambers a Grave
Concern, Special Representative Tells Security Council amid Calls for Continued High-Level Dialogue,
U.N. Press Release SC/13199 (Feb. 7, 2018) (expressing the statements of Vlora Çitaku, the ambassador
from the Republic of Kosovo to the United States).
235. See PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY, supra note 231, at 20 (noting that 64.8 percent of Albanians
and 53.2 percent of Serbs believe “it is important to deal with all crimes committed”); see also Serbeze
Haxhiaj, In Kosovo, Distrust of Hague War Crimes Court Simmers, BALKAN TRANSITIONAL JUST. (May
12, 2020, 8:46 AM), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/12/in-kosovo-distrust-of-hague-war-crimescourt-simmers/ (expressing one Serb’s opinion that “[a]ll crimes committed against civilians should be
punished, whatever their ethnic background.”).

OCHS READY FOR ADOBE(DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

12/19/2022 10:08 PM

FORCED JUSTICE: THE KOSOVO SPECIALIST CHAMBERS

273

selective justice.236
In declining to incorporate local involvement in the establishment of the
KSC, and essentially cutting Kosovo out of the process of creating the Court,
the international community undermined local support and legitimacy from
the beginning. Yet, even if the KSC had incorporated local involvement into
its creation and operations, witness intimidation, evidence tampering, and
the other challenges faced by the previous judicial institutions utilized in
Kosovo would still be present, demonstrating yet another reason why the
circumstances in Kosovo were not conducive to the KSC’s creation.
2. Multiple Attempts at Justice
The KSC is the international community’s fourth attempt at justice and
its third use of a hybrid court to prosecute crimes committed in the Kosovo
War. Rather than making a concerted effort to fix the problems afflicting the
previous hybrid courts, including the EULEX Courts, the EU chose to start
afresh with the creation of a new and costly tribunal that carries a mandate
which overlaps significantly with its predecessors.237 The creation of
multiple courts to prosecute the same crimes undermines the legitimacy of
international prosecutions. It suggests that the international community—
largely the EU—is willing to create as many judicial mechanisms as
necessary to achieve its anticipated result, regardless of cost. This perception
is reflected in public opinion within Kosovo, with many surveyed believing
that the KSC is not fundamentally different from the predecessor courts and
was created only because those courts failed to achieve justice.238 Moreover,
because of the KSC’s overlapping mandate with the predecessor courts, it is
possible, and even probable, that the Court will investigate and prosecute
defendants who have already been prosecuted, and in some cases,
acquitted.239
One of the most problematic concerns in creating a new court to
prosecute previously adjudicated crimes is that the KSC remains susceptible

236. VISOKA, supra note 1, at 27.
237. See Pineles, supra note 155 (noting that EULEX’s problems “could have been ameliorated, if
not solved, if a concerted effort had been made to do so”).
238. PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY, supra note 231, at 15–16.
239. For example, it is probable that the Court will target former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj,
whom the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office called in for questioning, prompting Haradinaj’s resignation.
Haxhiaj, supra note 235; Associated Press, Kosovo Leader Resigns after Being Called to War Crimes
Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/world/europe/kosovo-leaderresigns-after-being-called-to-war-crimes-court.html. This will be the second time that Haradinaj is
prosecuted for post-war crimes; he was previously investigated, prosecuted, and acquitted by Carla Del
Ponte, the Prosecutor of the ICTY. CARLA DEL PONTE, MADAME PROSECUTOR 294 (2008).
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to the systemic challenges that plagued its predecessor courts. The KSC’s
international composition and far removed location were specifically chosen
to respond to issues of political interference and witness tampering that
afflicted the ICTY, the Regulation 64 Panels, and the EULEX Courts.240
However, the likelihood that the KSC’s deliberate internationalization will
successfully fix these problems is far from certain.241 First, such international
composition and far removed location did little to prevent witness tampering
before the ICTY.242 Like the KSC, the ICTY staffed exclusively international
actors and sat in The Hague, very close to where the KSC currently stands.243
Yet, despite these apparent safeguards—which the KSC now replicates—the
ICTY endured significant issues pertaining to political interference and
witness intimidation and tampering, especially with regard to Kosovar
witnesses.244
Further, despite still being in the early stages of its work, the KSC has
already fallen victim to political interference and witness intimidation. In a
June 2020 press statement, the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office broke from
policy245 and publicized its indictments against Hashim Thaçi and Kadri
Veseli, recognizing that these defendants had engaged in a “secret campaign
to . . . obstruct the work of the Court.”246 Then, in September 2020, pursuant
to warrants issued by the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, two organizational
leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army War Veterans’ Association were
arrested for interference with the administration of justice and witness
intimidation.247 The arrests stemmed from the men’s distribution to the
media of confidential and non-public information related to ongoing cases,
including the names and personal details of potential witnesses.248
240. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 25.
241. Id. at 34–35 (noting that “UNMIK and EULEX’s record shows that it . . . cannot be assumed
international organi[z]ations—and the staff therein—will be immune to the very issues that undoubtedly
afflict Kosovo’s domestic judicial system”).
242. Pineles, supra note 155.
243. Cohen, supra note 39, at 15–16.
244. Williams, supra note 21, at 36; see also Robert Cryer, Witness Tampering and International
Criminal Tribunals, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 191 (2014) (discussing the ICTY’s multiple incidents of
witness tampering and intimidation, including in the Haradinaj case).
245. Kos. Specialist Chambers, Press Statement, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST
PROSECUTOR’S OFF. (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.scp-ks.org/en/specialist-prosecutor-initiatesadditional-proceedings (noting the Prosecutor’s general policy of keeping the contents of indictments
confidential pending confirmation by a pre-trial judge).
246. Kos. Specialist Prosecutor’s Off., supra note 228.
247. Hysni Gucati & Nasim Haradinaj, KOS. SPECIALIST CHAMBERS & SPECIALIST PROSECUTOR’S
OFF., https://www.scp-ks.org/en/cases/hysni-gucati-nasim-haradinaj/en (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
248. Prosecutor v. Gucati and Haradinaj, Case No. KSC-BC-2020-07, Warrant of Arrest (Sept. 24,
2020),
https://repository.scp-
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Moreover, the Court’s internationalized structure does nothing to
counter the “central impediment” that afflicted many of its prior courts:
Kosovo’s “ancestral custom . . . of entrenched clan loyalty” that has
prevented many witnesses from testifying in the predecessor courts against
members of their ethnic groups or extended families.249 Despite the KSC’s
efforts to provide witness security and protection,250 local Kosovar opinion
reflects an unwavering belief that testifying before the KSC would be
dangerous, with 82.1 percent of ethnic Serbs and 48.8 percent of ethnic
Albanians surveyed in 2017 believing it is not safe for witnesses to testify
before the Court.251 The creators of the KSC erred in thinking that the
creation of a new international court would cure the problems of the hybrid
courts that came before it; instead, even with its international character, the
KSC will likely face similar challenges and new problems, while losing
many of the benefits of traditional hybrid courts.
B. Undermining Hybrid Objectives
Like most courts, the KSC’s mandate focuses exclusively on obtaining
accountability for crimes.252 However, the Court’s status as a hybrid tribunal
carries other implicit goals, especially pertaining to transitional justice
initiatives.253 In addition to accountability measures, hybrid courts—due to
their structure and local involvement—can provide significant benefits by
fostering peace and stability within the post-conflict states in which they sit
and within the greater geographical regions,254 facilitating on-the-ground
victim support and outreach, and implementing capacity building measures
within states’ legal and judicial systems.255
ks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e980356a3f&doc_type=stl_filing_annex&lang=eng (noting that
“grounded suspicion” also exists that Hysni Gucati, the leader of the War Veterans’ Association,
committed the crimes of retaliation and violating the secrecy of proceedings); Prosecutor v. Gucati and
Haradinaj, Case No. KSC-BC-2018-01, Warrant of Arrest (Sept. 24, 2020), https://repository.scpks.org/details.php?doc_id=091ec6e980356a6c&doc_type=stl_filing_annex&lang=eng (leveling similar
accusations against Nasim Haradinaj, the deputy head of the War Veterans’ Association).
249. See MARTY REPORT, supra note 146, at 26.
250. VISOKA, supra note 11, at 21.
251. PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY, supra note 231, at 18.
252. Law on Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, No. 05/L-053, art. 1(2) (Kos.).
253. See Cockayne, supra note 43, at 622–24 (identifying a number of measurements for the success
of hybrid tribunals, but specifically recognizing that from the viewpoint of the population affected by the
crimes being prosecuted. These include the building of a historical record, the prosecution of those
individuals most responsible for the crimes, strengthening the judicial system and rule of law, and
protecting victims’ rights).
254. Cohen, supra note 39, at 36.
255. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 40, at 306–07 (explaining that hybrid tribunals can help solve
problems of legitimacy and a lack of capacity building present in exclusively domestic or international
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Yet, such goals are only attainable when the tribunal is perceived as
legitimate by the state or local community it is designed to serve.256 The
hybrid model’s potential to gain legitimacy with the local population is
directly correlated to its incorporation of local involvement in the judicial
process.257 When justice is imposed by international actors from a farremoved court, victims and the impacted society are much more reluctant to
accept this as legitimate justice.258 Without local involvement and the
legitimacy that extends therefrom, capacity building of the local judiciary is
rendered nearly impossible, and outreach measures to victims are made
significantly more difficult.259 Moreover, without the involvement in the
court of the parties or victims to the conflict at issue, chances of promoting
stability or reconciliation between feuding groups or territories are also
minimized.260
By sacrificing local involvement in favor of an internationalized
tribunal, the international community has hindered the KSC’s potential
legitimacy in Kosovo, a decision that may be devastating to the Court’s
effectiveness and legacy. As evidenced by recent public polls within
Kosovo, the public at large is heavily skeptical of the Court’s ability to
provide impartial justice.261 This stems in part from the widely held belief
among Kosovars that it is impossible for a court operated by international
judges and prosecutors outside of Kosovo to provide fair trials for its
defendants.262 Because the KSC is still in the early stages of its proceedings,
the authors’ evaluation of the Court’s potential to achieve these goals is
courts).
256. Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 268; Hobbs, supra note 16, at 495 (recognizing that
“without legitimacy, the promised benefits of hybrid courts will be lost”); Hehir, The Assumptions, supra
note 10, at 31 (noting that tribunals that lack legitimacy will find it difficult for the local population to
accept or respect their judicial decisions).
257. See Hobbs, supra note 16, at 487 (arguing that hybrid courts whose judicial benches best reflect
their society hold the most potential in terms of legitimacy).
258. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 30; RATNER ET AL., supra note 47, at 229; see also
Dustin N. Sharp, Assessing Dilemmas of the Global and the Local in Transitional Justice, 29 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 71, 72 (2014) (recognizing that international intervention pertaining to post-conflict justice
when “perceived as being imposed ‘from the outside’ may spark backlash and resentment that undermines
both legitimacy and effectiveness”).
259. See Dickinson, supra note 40, at 303 (“[A] purely international process that largely bypasses
the local population does little to help build local capacity.”); Cohen, supra note 39, at 6 (noting that
outreach becomes much more difficult when justice is obtained “without the participation of nationals of
the countries in question”).
260. RATNER ET AL., supra note 47, at 252.
261. PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY, supra note 231, at 15 (concluding that 67.4 percent of ethnic Serbs
and 42.4 percent of ethnic Albanians believe it is not possible that alleged perpetrators will be given a
fair trial).
262. Id. at 15.
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purely predictive. However, the Court’s lack of legitimacy stemming from
its internationalization significantly undermines the KSC’s potential to
achieve the non-retributive goals generally associated with hybrid tribunals,
such as facilitating inter-ethnic and inter-state reconciliation, promoting
peace and stability, and providing capacity building measures to members of
the Kosovar judiciary and legal community.
1. Reconciliation
Despite the two decades that have passed since the Kosovo War,
Kosovo remains a divided nation. Deep tensions run between its various
ethnic groups, especially between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs.263 The
Court’s primary international supporters, including the EU and the United
States, have repeatedly touted the KSC as a means to “achieve reconciliation
and build a better future.”264 However, these statements by international
actors reflect a strong disconnect between international perspectives and the
strongly-held beliefs of the local Kosovar community.
In fact, rather than promoting the “peace, stability, and prosperity”
anticipated by the Court’s proponents,265 the KSC may exacerbate longexisting tensions between ethnic Albanians and Serbs. As scholar Aiden
Hehir recognizes, without legitimacy, courts lack the ability to invoke
changes in societal attitudes, and their judicial decisions will not be able to
“counter nationalistic narratives regarding the attribution of blame and the
designation of ‘heroes’ and ‘villains.’”266 This was the exact situation
encountered by the exclusively international ICTY. As Hehir notes, much of
the population of Former Yugoslavian states perceived the ICTY as an
“illegitimate ‘alien’ court biased against their particular national group,” and
as such, the Court failed to convince Yugoslavs that its convictions of
defendants—many of whom were heralded as heroes by their respective
ethnic groups—were fair and legitimate.267 As a result, the ICTY did little to
normalize relations among ethnic groups in the Former Yugoslavia; to the

263. Serbia/Kosovo: Events of 2019, HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2020/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo (last visited July 9, 2020).
264. U.S. Embassy Pristina, Statement of EU Embassies/Offices, EUSR/EU Office and US Embassy
in Kosovo on the Adoption of Constitutional Amendment and Law on the Establishment of the Specialist
Chambers, U.S. EMBASSY IN KOS. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://xk.usembassy.gov/joint-statement/. See also
Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 2 (recognizing that international parties have touted the KSC
as “essential to facilitating transitional justice and societal progress in Kosovo, as well as enabling Kosovo
to further integrate into the international system”).
265. Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 270.
266. Hehir, The Assumptions, supra note 10, at 30.
267. Id. at 30.
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contrary, in fact, many of the individuals investigated and prosecuted by the
ICTY eventually returned to public office and even saw a rise in popularity
among their ethnic groups.268
The potential to inflame ethnic tensions is even more prevalent in the
KSC. While the ICTY intended to prosecute defendants from all of the
feuding groups involved in the Balkan Wars, the KSC was created to
primarily target one ethnic group—the Kosovar Albanians who served in the
KLA. This limited mandate is especially controversial since, in Kosovo
Albanian society, KLA fighters are routinely heralded as heroes who
liberated Kosovo from Serbia’s autocratic rule.269 The mandate also
amplifies allegations of bias against the Court. Indeed, as of 2017, an
overwhelming 76.4 percent of ethnic Albanians surveyed believed the KSC
was unfair and biased.270 Given this outlook, any decision the Court issues
against a KLA fighter will likely not promote reconciliation. Rather, such a
decision will validate the widely held view of the Court as a biased institution
and deepen the divide between Albanians and their Serb counterparts. In fact,
as of 2017, a majority of ethnic Albanians described themselves as willing
and ready to protest in response to a number of potential Court actions
against KLA members.271 Even more startlingly, 36 percent of ethnic
Albanians surveyed admitted they would act to directly interfere with the
Court and the Specialist Prosecutor to prevent prosecutions of KLA
members.272
As a heavily internationalized court, the KSC will remain physically
and intangibly removed from the Kosovar people. As a result—and in stark
contrast to its proponents’ claims—the KSC holds a slim chance of
normalizing relations between ethnic groups within the state. By not
engaging the local population in the establishment of the Court or
incorporating local insight in creating the Court’s mandate, the Court is
seeking justice different from that desired and needed by the Kosovar people.
Thus, rather than promoting peace, the KSC’s decisions carry a greater
possibility of entrenching nationalist narratives and increasing tensions
within Kosovo.

268. Id. at 30–31.
269. Id. at 31.
270. PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY, supra note 231, at 13; see also Visoka, supra note 1, at 27
(recognizing that “the attitude of the general public in Kosovo to the Specialist Court is mainly negative,”
in part because of “the lack of local ownership and transparency about the process”).
271. PUBLIC PERCEPTION STUDY, supra note 231, at 16 (reflecting that 64 percent of ethnic
Albanians would consider protesting if the Court declared the KLA to be a terrorist organization).
272. Id.
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2. Peace & Stability
In addition to fostering reconciliation between ethnic groups, as a
hybrid court, the KSC also has the capacity to implement transitional justice
measures to foster community involvement and collaboration, facilitate truth
sharing, and provide victim support in efforts to promote peace and stability
within Kosovo.273 These measures recognize that justice “is not just about
sending people to jail, [but] about building the community.”274 Again,
however, the lack of local involvement in the KSC precludes transitional
justice measures, and instead presents greater threats to peace and stability
in Kosovo.
The UN defines transitional justice as “the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a
legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve
justice and achieve reconciliation.”275 Transitional justice can encompass a
broad array of mechanisms beyond prosecution, including the creation of
investigatory commissions aimed at developing a historical record of the
wrongs committed, public apologies, reparations, and lustration, among
other things.276 These mechanisms—in whichever form they may take—
provide recognition of victims’ suffering and allow a post-conflict state to
discover truths within the conflict and face its history.277 They permit a postconflict state to move beyond its violent past and towards peace, stability,
and a stronger appreciation for the rule of law.278 The EU itself recognizes
273. See Raub, supra note 40, at 1043 (noting the flexibility inherent to the hybrid model).
274. Trahan, supra note 42, at 911.
275. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General, United Nations Approach to
Transitional
Justice,
at
2
(Mar.
2010),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf
[hereinafter
U.N.
Guidance Note on Transitional Justice]; see also Melissa S. Williams & Rosemary Nagy, Introduction to
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 20–21 (Melissa S. Williams et al. eds., 2012) (recognizing transitional justice
as comprising institutions that help transition a state or society from an authoritarian or “rights-abusing
regime” to a “rights-respecting liberal democratic constitutional order.”).
276. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 47, ch. 10 (explaining various non-prosecutorial options to
provide victims with transitional justice); U.N. Guidance Note on Transitional Justice, supra note 275, at
2.
277. Dustin N. Sharp, Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist: Linking Peacebuilding and Transitional
Justice through the Lens of Critique, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 165, 175 (2013) (“[T]ransitional justice is often
said to be both backward looking, insofar as it is closely associated with justice and accountability for
previous human rights violations, and forward looking, insofar as its advocates often claim that justice is
essential to prevent recurrence and to lay the groundwork for longer term peace and stability.”); see also
Matthew F. Putorti, The International Legal Right to Individual Compensation in Nepal and the
Transitional Justice Context, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1131, 1146-48 (2011) (enumerating the various
backward and forward looking goals of transitional justice).
278. See Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
Understanding Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 47 (2002) (noting that “truth and

OCHS READY FOR ADOBE (DO NOT DELETE)

280

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/19/2022 10:08 PM

[Vol 32:239

the importance of transitional justice as an integral part of “state- and peacebuilding.”279
Given Kosovo’s status as a new state birthed from conflict and plagued
by lasting inter-state and intra-state tensions, transitional justice measures
are especially imperative. Yet, despite this critical need, these measures were
significantly lacking in the predecessor courts. Instead, the predecessor
courts focused nearly exclusively on accountability measures to the
exclusion of transitional justice efforts and victim-oriented processes, such
as “truth-seeking, victim support, apologies, reparations[,] and community
reconciliation.”280 This retribution-focused approach has not succeeded in
fostering peace between Kosovo and Serbia, nor does it contribute to greater
stability within Kosovo.281
Supporters of the KSC hoped the Court would not only quell interethnic tensions within Kosovo, but would also aid in normalizing relations
between Kosovo and Serbia, paving the way for Kosovo to fully join the
international community, and validating the EU and the United States’ longrunning financial and logistical support of the country.282 Despite the nearly
twenty years that have passed since the Kosovo War, Serbia refuses to
recognize Kosovo as an independent nation.283 Western-facilitated
negotiations between the two countries—in which the EU and the United
States have had very heavy involvement—have been ongoing since 2011,284
and a comprehensive agreement between the two states remains elusive.
Kosovo’s advancement towards EU and UN membership is conditional upon
its normalization of relations with Serbia,285 and thus, a bilateral agreement
between the nations is critical for Kosovo’s growth and stability. Some of
the main impediments to reaching a Serbia-Kosovo agreement have been
Serbia’s refusal to apologize for war crimes committed during the Kosovo
War or to address the thousands of persons who went missing during the
accountability are essential if traumatized societies are to begin resolving their political, ethnic, racial,
and religious conflicts through democratic processes, rather than through torture, rape, and genocide.”).
279. The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice, at 1 (Nov. 16, 2015),
https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/the_eus_policy_framework_on_support_to_transiti
onal_justice.pdf; Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 272.
280. VISOKA, supra note 1, at 16.
281. Id.
282. Hehir, Lessons Learned?, supra note 14, at 270.
283. Jovana Gec, AP Explains: Why Do Serbia-Kosovo Tensions Persist?, ASSOC. PRESS (May 29,
2019), https://apnews.com/article/5d6963a912494fbaaa21f3ee316253cb.
284. Xhorxhina Bami, Stalled Serbia-Kosovo Dialogue Set to Resume in July, BALKAN INSIGHT (July
6, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/07/06/stalled-serbia-kosovo-dialogue-set-to-resumein-july/.
285. RUSSELL, supra note 24, at 2.
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war.286 Because none of the international courts dedicated to prosecuting war
crimes, including the KSC, have incorporated elements of truth telling or
public apologies into their operations, the Kosovar people have still not
received the information or acceptance of responsibility that they so desire
from Serbia.287 In prioritizing the need for international accountability over
the Kosovar people’s desire for truth and a clear historical record, the KSC
further threatens the potential for Kosovo-Serbia negotiations. By failing to
implement local involvement, the creators of the KSC have not modeled the
Court to achieve the types of justice that the local communities and people
desire, and as a result, threaten the potential to cultivate peace and stability
throughout Kosovo.
3. Capacity Building
One of the most significant benefits of hybrid tribunals is their ability
to assist in building or rebuilding legal systems and strengthening the rule of
law in post-conflict states.288 The hybrid model, through the incorporation of
local judges and attorneys within the court, provides a unique opportunity to
train local lawyers, judges, and court personnel to prepare post-conflict
domestic judiciaries to enact justice at “an internationally acceptable level,”
and to foster appreciation among the national community for the rule of
law.289 Local involvement in hybrid tribunals provides double-sided benefits,
in that local legal personnel receive “on the job training,” whereas their
international counterparts in the court can “gain greater sensitivity to local
issues, local culture, and local approaches to justice,” thereby allowing them
to mold their prosecutorial strategies to render culturally competent
justice.290 However, this critical benefit is unattainable in post-conflict courts
dominated by international actors. As scholar Laura Dickinson has noted,
“[a]n international court staffed by foreigners, or even a local justice system
286. VISOKA, supra note 1, at 16.
287. Id.
288. See John D. Ciorciari & Anne Heindel, Experiments in International Criminal Justice: Lessons
from the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 369, 431 (2014) (noting that hybrid courts located
in the state which they are designed to serve have numerous theoretical options for building or rebuilding
the local legal system); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1220
(2007) (also recognizing the theoretical capacity building opportunities inherent in the hybrid model of
prosecution); RATNER ET AL., supra note 47, at 248 (noting that “exposure to of the local judiciary and
bar to their international counterparts can build and strengthen the legal infrastructure”).
289. Milena Sterio, Seeking the Best Forum to Prosecute International War Crimes: Proposed
Paradigms and Solutions, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 887, 900 (2006); see also FICHTELBERG, supra note 214, at
214 (recognizing the hybrid model’s ability to positively influence domestic legal and judicial institutions
as its “greatest contribution to international justice”).
290. Dickinson, supra note 40, at 307.
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operated exclusively by [international actors] . . . will do little to help
improve the capacity of the local population to establish its own justice
system.”291
Modeling the KSC as an internationally staffed court based in The
Hague, rather than as a typical hybrid court, deprives it of the potential to
train Kosovar lawyers and judges in international legal skills.292 Without
“side by side” collaboration between Kosovar and international lawyers and
judges, the KSC is abandoning a critical benefit of its hybrid character and
surrendering an opportunity to strengthen the rule of law within Kosovo. And
while Kosovo may be several decades removed from the Kosovo War, the
nation’s legal system would still greatly benefit from the type of international
capacity building inherent in the hybrid model. Serious flaws continue to
afflict Kosovo’s legal and judicial systems and hamper the rule of law within
the country. Based on a 2016 study conducted by Southeast European
Leadership for Development and Integrity and financed by the EU, the court
system is recognized by the Kosovar people as the third most corrupt public
institution in the country.293 A 2018 survey also reflects that the vast majority
of Kosovar citizens believe that persons with political power or influence are
less likely to face legal repercussions.294 If the KSC fails to successfully
prosecute and convict political leaders whom it has already recognized as
perpetrators of war crimes, this failure will simply validate these existing
perceptions and will further undermine confidence in the rule of law within
Kosovo.
C. Dangerous Precedent for Hybrid Tribunals
While the KSC’s excessively international nature poses potential
detriments in terms of legitimacy and transitional justice initiatives within
Kosovo, it also presents numerous concerns for the future of the hybrid
model of prosecuting atrocity crimes. This is a time of uncertainty for the
hybrid model. After nearly two decades of hybrid courts, many of which
failed to achieve accountability for the crimes set forth in their mandates, as
291. Id. at 304; see also Trahan, supra note 42, at 888 (noting that in an interview with scholar
Carsten Stahn, he expressed that when hybrid courts are “fully transplanted” from the targeted state, it is
more difficult to create a “spillover effect [of international training and skills] on the domestic system”).
292. Dickinson, supra note 40, at 304.
293. SE. EUR. LEADERSHIP FOR DEV. AND INTEGRITY, ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN KOSOVO
2016,
at
18
(2016),
https://seldi.net/fileadmin/public/PDF/Publications/CAR_Kosovo/
ASSESSMENT_OF_CORRUPTION-ENG_FINAL__002_.pdf (finding that, on a scale from 1 to 5,
respondents consider the “degree of corruption proliferation” in the Kosovo courts to be a 2.64).
294. ROLPIK, http://www.rolpik.org/ (last visited July 9, 2020) (finding that 74.4 percent of Kosovar
citizens think that persons with political influence are less likely to be punished).
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well as those non-accountability goals expected by the international
community, many have become disillusioned with hybrid tribunals.295 There
have been numerous discussions promoting the creation of future hybrid
courts. However, after repeated failures, the willingness of the international
community—through the UN and regional establishments like the EU—to
move forward in creating courts that follow this model is tenuous at best.296
In the event that the KSC fails to achieve its accountability goals, as well as
the corresponding peace and stability promised, its legacy could be
potentially damning for the future of hybrid courts.
Hybrid tribunals have proven they can obtain justice in areas where
purely international or domestic judicial mechanisms cannot; they can also
provide benefits beyond mere retribution, such as transitional justice
initiatives, which are largely impossible to obtain through other purely
domestic or international courts.297 However, in order to achieve these
goals—both those grounded in accountability and those in transitional
justice—hybrid courts must be used selectively. Their use should be limited
to situations in which they hold a true possibility of providing impartial and
comprehensive justice for widespread crimes or human rights abuses and
where there exists political and local support for a hybrid court and its
mandate.298 Notably, they should not be driven by international objectives
unrelated to justice or used as political tools, as was the case with the KSC.
Where international objectives diverge significantly from local justice goals,
a hybrid court will most likely be unsuccessful. Further, the international
community should avoid using hybrid courts to achieve a specific type of
justice where numerous other mechanisms have failed. In the event a hybrid
tribunal is so used, however, the international community must take great
pains to mold the tribunal at issue to avoid encountering the same problems
or controversies that plagued its predecessor mechanisms.
In addition to this selective use, hybrid tribunals must also incorporate
local involvement and ownership over the judicial process. Largely
removing local participation from a hybrid court, such as by locating the
court outside of the targeted state or exclusively staffing it with international
legal actors—both of which were done in creating the KSC—undermines the
295. See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 16, at 488 (noting that hybrid tribunals fell out of favor because
they failed to achieve their “lofty goals”); McAuliffe, supra note 32, at 1 (explaining that in the decade
after hybrid tribunals were created, their popularity declined dramatically).
296. See Stahn, supra note 18 (noting the uncertainty of the future of the hybrid model of
international adjudication).
297. See Raub, supra note 40, at 1017 (explaining how the flexibility inherent in the hybrid model
allows creators to mold each hybrid court to the needs of the victims).
298. FICHTELBERG, supra note 214, at 180.
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theoretical objectives of the hybrid model. Removing the local element
compromises the perceived legitimacy of the court within the state and
precludes capacity building or other transitional justice initiatives.299 By
creating a hybrid court under substandard conditions and in a manner that
prevents it from achieving many of the theoretical objectives of the hybrid
model, the international community has undermined the KSC from the start.
Limiting the KSC’s potential to achieve success by stylizing it as an ultrainternationalized domestic court, rather than as a true hybrid that
incorporates local objectives and involvement presents serious concern that
the international community will decline to utilize the hybrid model to
prosecute future mass atrocities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The stated mandate of the KSC is a noble step towards addressing
impunity for war crimes. The authors would like to clarify that this paper
does not advocate for allowing KLA members responsible for committing
grave atrocity crimes to remain in high-ranking positions of national
leadership within Kosovo or to escape justice. However, the creation of the
KSC as an internationalized domestic tribunal—or in other words, a hybrid
tribunal lacking hybridity—gravely impairs the Court’s chances of success,
both in terms of its ability to successfully prosecute and convict defendants
and its ability to garner respect and legitimacy throughout Kosovo.
Moreover, it casts further doubt on the efficiency and effectiveness of the
hybrid model, which has long been criticized by scholars and practitioners
alike.300
The way to achieve justice for crimes and assist Kosovo in facing its
traumatic history is not to continue with the problematic prosecutorial
methods used in the past or to continue to force justice from the outside. The
Kosovar people should be permitted to play a role in the judicial process and,
in a democratic manner, lend their voice to how and what type of justice is
provided. Rather than an internationally operated court located in countries
removed from where the Kosovo War occurred, the international community
had several more effective alternatives to consider in providing justice for
299. Daimeon Dean Shanks, From Aspirational to Prescriptive Capacity Building: Post-Conflict
States, Rule of Law, and Hybrid International Justice, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 1195, 1220 (2019) (noting
that when a hybrid is internationally dominated, “the local population may not feel they have any
ownership of the process, exposing the court to charges of imperialism”).
300. See RATNER ET AL., supra note 47, at 252 (discussing common challenges that afflicted hybrid
tribunals); Hobbs, supra note 16, at 488 (noting the argument that while the hybrid model began as a
“golden child” of international criminal justice, it eventually became an “orphan,” after hybrid courts
failed to achieve their “lofty goals”).
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KLA crimes. As Dean Pineles, a former American EULEX judge, has
advocated, the EU could have continued to operate the EULEX Courts while
incorporating modifications, such as greater international protections, to
address their most significant issues of witness intimidation and political
interference.301 In doing so, EULEX would have maintained the truly hybrid
nature of its composition and structure while at the same time ensuring
international oversight. It would also have kept the courts located within the
territory of Kosovo, thereby preserving a geographic connection to the local
Kosovar population and permitting locals and victims to attend the criminal
proceedings.
Alternatively, the EU and the international community could have
decided to fund and implement a transitional justice mechanism, such as a
truth and reconciliation commission, in Kosovo. Such a mechanism would
not have been able to provide criminal retribution for defendants. However,
it could have created a comprehensive historical record of the crimes
committed during and following the Kosovo War, provided victims with the
opportunity to share their stories, and delivered victims clarity on missing
relatives. While such an approach may have been unappealing to the
international community given its lack of accountability, it would have
promoted peace, stability, and reconciliation both within Kosovo as well as
between Kosovo and Serbia.
By declining these options and instead moving forward with the
creation of an entirely new internationally operated court outside Kosovo,
the EU sacrificed the Kosovar population’s needs for justice in favor of
international political objectives. In so doing, the international community
has threatened the potential for comprehensive and transitional justice within
Kosovo, as well as the future of the hybrid model of prosecution.

301. Pineles, supra note 155.

